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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen much debate about the role of national courts
in addressing global harms. That debate has focused on the application
by domestic courts of international law-for instance, in civil actions
brought in U.S. courts to enforce human rights law. This Article
identifies a parallel development in the area of economic regulation. It
classifies and analyzes a category of cases that seek the application of
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regulatory law by domestic courts in situations involving global
economic misconduct. Like the public international law cases, these
cases highlight the tension between the benefits to be gained by
enhanced enforcement of global substantive norms and the need to
observe the jurisdictional norms that order the exercise of authority
within the international community. On the one hand, traditional
jurisdictional rules unnecessarily foreclose valid arguments for
marshaling the resources of national courts in order to improve the
global welfare. On the other hand, however, those rules reflect
legitimate concerns of foreign states about the exercise of power and
authority within the international community. The Article seeks a
resolution to that tension in the economic context. Situating
transnational regulatory litigation within the broader framework of
transgovernmental theory, it proposes a more functional approach to
certain jurisdictional rules, as well as a procedural mechanism for use in
cross-border class actions, that would legitimize the evolving role of
national courts in implementing global regulatory strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Defining the proper role of courts on the global stage has become an
increasingly prominent topic.' While debate in this area addresses in
part the proliferation of courts outside national systems,2 it also
addresses the development of national courts as actors within the
international community. Recent analyses of the use of domestic
litigation to counter global harms, drawing particularly on the spate of
cases brought in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),3
1. The general rubric of judicial globalization encompasses a number of disparate issues,
including the proliferation of regional, international, and ad hoc tribunals; the use of foreign law
in domestic decision-making; and the "globalization" of the judicial enterprise itself. See
generally 38, 39 & 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. (2003, 2004 & 2005) (symposia on judicial globalization
providing an overview of these issues).
2. Such courts include new international courts (e.g., the International Criminal Court),
regional courts (e.g., the European Court of Human Rights) and ad hoc tribunals (e.g., the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). See generally Cesare
P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709 (1999).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (granting U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over claims by foreign
plaintiffs for violations of international law). Another example of such litigation is that initiated in
Belgian courts pursuant to Belgium's then-expansive war crimes statute. See Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 375 (2004).
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have focused primarily on transnational public law litigation. This is a
form of domestic civil litigation in which courts apply international law
norms in order to secure remedies for violations of those norms that are
not otherwise available.' The cases are therefore viewed as a means of
marshaling the resources of national courts in order to enhance global
compliance with international law.6 In addition to closing a gap in
international enforcement mechanisms, however, these cases also give
domestic courts a role in the transnational process of articulating and
defending global norms for the benefit of the international community.7
The validity and scope of this role for domestic courts are highly
contested. Many transnational cases put pressure on traditional
jurisdictional principles, as they envision adjudication in domestic
courts of cases with only tenuous connections to the forum. The claim
of the forum state to prescriptive authority over the conduct in question
therefore often relies on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, a theory
whose parameters in the civil context remain uncertain.! The cases thus
4. See Harold Koh's work on "transnational public law litigation," drawing on Abram
Chayes' account of private litigation used to serve public goals. Harold Hongju Koh, Civil
Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 169, 194 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371 (1991).
5. In the human rights context, for example, plaintiffs brought cases pursuant to the ATCA as
a way of increasing compliance with and enforcement of human rights law when other
mechanisms had failed. See Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights Abuses: Civil
Litigation in Domestic Courts, 40 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 117 (1997) (discussing the
insufficiency of other mechanisms).
6. Anne-Marie Slaughter refers to the process as "'borrow[ing]' government institutions of
democratic states to achieve a measure of justice" not otherwise obtainable. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 194 (Sept.-Oct. 1997). See also
Stephens, supra note 5, at 140 (envisioning the spread of such civil litigation beyond the United
States, creating an "international network" in the service of this goal).
7. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet
Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 129, 132 (2000) (in the human rights context, noting that such litigation "affirms the role of
domestic institutions in enforcing international obligations."); Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, supra note 4, at 2349 (describing the prospective goal of plaintiffs in transnational
public cases: "provok[ing] judicial articulation of a norm of transnational law"); Paul B. Stephan,
A Becoming Modesty: U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
627, 643 (2002) (distinguishing between the distributive function of civil litigation and the
expressive function, in which litigation "serve[s] as a nexus of discourse that will instruct and
elevate both the participants and the broader public.").
8. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb.
14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal), available at
http://www. icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe ijudgment 20020214
higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF (discussing the status of universal jurisdiction); Regina v.
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reflect significant tension between the benefits to be gained by enhanced
enforcement of global substantive norms and the need to observe the
jurisdictional norms that order the exercise of authority within the
international community. What the debate arising out of that tension has
not yet addressed, however, is a parallel role for national courts that is
developing in the economic regulatory arena. This is not to say that
there is a lack of interest in the use of private actions to sue for cross-
border regulatory harm--quite the opposite, as the abundant
commentary on extraterritorial regulation reflects. This article takes up a
different issue: the evolution and viability of claims that explicitly
promote litigation before national courts on the basis of shared norms
and that might therefore serve as an instrument of global economic
regulation.9 In doing so, it seeks to fill a gap in the analysis of
transnational litigation.
The Article analyzes the development in U.S. federal courts of a
phenomenon analogous to that observed in the public law arena, which I
will refer to as transnational regulatory litigation. It examines certain
cases brought under U.S. regulatory law, including antitrust law,
securities law and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, that operate similarly to transnational public law
cases: they seek to apply a shared norm, in domestic courts, for the
benefit of the international community. There is of course a major
structural difference between regulatory litigation and other forms of
transnational litigation-while transnational public law litigation turns
on the application of international law, these cases apply domestic
economic law."0 I will nevertheless argue that where the particular rule
reflects an internationally shared norm, such cases serve the same broad
purpose. They can mobilize available judicial resources to address
challenges to global economic welfare, just as the public law cases
address challenges in areas such as global human rights. Further, they
are subject to the same criticism: that, especially while such litigation is
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (differentiating the civil and criminal strands of universal jurisdiction).
9. See infra Part I.B.1 (distinguishing such claims from typical extraterritoriality cases). But
cf Stephan, supra note 7 (discussing not only cases involving application of a shared norm, but
the broadening jurisdiction of U.S. courts generally in cases of extraterritorial regulation).
10. In some of the cases discussed below, the original complaints also included counts under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. My
discussion focuses on the counts alleging violations of domestic regulatory law.
2006] 255
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conducted overwhelmingly in U.S. courts," it may operate as an
instrument of hegemony.
I have two major objectives in this Article. First, I want to
systematize the category of cases that I describe as transnational
regulatory litigation. This task requires an analysis of the regulatory
goals such litigation serves and an explanation of how these cases differ
from more traditional cases in which the jurisdictional question is one
simply of extraterritoriality. Second, I want to promote a serious
consideration of the substantive regulatory benefits these cases may
present. This requires a close inspection of the jurisdictional framework
within which they are currently considered, and an analysis of why that
framework fails adequately to address arguments about these benefits.
At the same time, it requires an evaluation of legitimate concerns about
power and authority within the international community-concerns that
traditional jurisdictional law both reflects and frames.
With these goals in mind, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I
begins by describing some recent cases that illustrate the concept of
transnational regulatory litigation. It then situates them within the
context of transnational litigation generally, examining their use to
address global harms and the regulatory benefits they promise. Part II
describes the jurisdictional rules used to decide the cases, identifying
various points at which those rules are insufficiently flexible to
encompass valid arguments for access to U.S. national courts. Part III
turns to a closer examination of the concerns that underpin the
jurisdictional rules, and that are raised by commentators as well as
foreign governments in opposition to transnational litigation. It
addresses both specific functional concerns regarding economic
litigation in U.S. courts, and also more general concerns regarding the
hegemony of the United States as a global actor. It concludes that the
global regulatory benefit of transnational regulatory litigation is
11. With some exceptions, including the cases brought in Belgium under that country's war
crimes statute and the Pinochet litigation in Britain, transnational litigation has taken place almost
exclusively in U.S. courts. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (discussing functional equivalents in other systems). See also Andrea
Bianchi, International Decision, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 242 (2005) (discussing a recent decision by
the Italian Court of Cassation in a tort action brought against Germany for damages arising out of
deportation and forced labor during World War 1); Sabine Pittrof, Compensation Claims for
Human Rights Breaches Committed by German Armed Forces During the Second World War, 5
GERMAN L.J. 15 (2004) (discussing a decision by the German Bundesgerichtshof in a similar
action brought by Greek citizens against Germany).
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insufficient to override entirely these concerns. Part IV seeks a solution
to this dilemma: a way to permit access to national courts where that
access will promote the global economic welfare, while respecting the
authority of foreign nations as members of the international community.
It suggests that such a solution depends on securing the consent of other
states-an element that characterizes successful mechanisms within the
transgovernmental legal regime. The Article concludes by proposing a
procedural device for use in global class actions that would achieve this
goal.
I. TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY LITIGATION
Transnational public law litigation takes place in the domestic courts
of a particular country, but involves the application of international law
norms. 2 The economic regulatory cases I describe below, by contrast,
seek the application of domestic law-for instance, U.S. federal
antitrust or securities law. The following Part sets forth some examples
of these cases, and then discusses why, despite their recourse to
domestic law, they fit within the framework of transnational litigation.
A. Categories of Cases
1. Regulation of Hard-Core Global Cartels
Recent litigation against participants in global cartels presents the
arguments for transnational regulatory litigation particularly clearly. In
a series of cases culminating in one heard by the Supreme Court in its
2004 term, foreign plaintiffs brought private actions in U.S. courts,
pursuant to U.S. antitrust law, for damages caused by the activities of
price-fixing cartels. 3 Each of the cartels in question had affected the
12. In ATCA cases, while claims are based in federal common law, courts derive the
elements of the rule to be applied from customary international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004) (discussing the application of claims derived from the
law of nations).
13. See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002) (case brought by
purchasers and sellers of art against two major auction houses, based on transactions occurring in
England); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001)
(case brought by a Norwegian oil company against the providers of heavy-lift barge services,
based on transactions occurring in the North Sea); Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.,
315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (case brought by
purchasers of vitamins against a consortium of pharmaceuticals manufacturers, based on
transactions occurring in Ecuador, the Ukraine, Australia, and Panama).
2006]
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relevant U.S. market. 14 The foreign plaintiffs, however, sought
compensation for damages arising out of purchase transactions executed
outside the United States. The cases therefore raised the question
whether U.S. antitrust law extended to global conduct whose effect was
felt in foreign as well as domestic transactions.
The plaintiffs' arguments in these cases focused on the global aspects
of the cartels' behavior. In the case later heard by the Supreme Court,
for instance, which addressed a cartel operating in the bulk vitamin
market, the plaintiffs stated that the success of the cartel depended on
keeping vitamin prices worldwide in equilibrium.15 (Otherwise, since
vitamins are easily transported, buyers would simply purchase in lower-
priced markets, defeating the purpose of the cartel.) They argued that
the defendants had fixed prices in the United States and then used those
prices as a benchmark for prices in other markets, thereby linking the
harm caused in one jurisdiction with market impact in others. 6 Their
starting point, in other words, was that the cartel had pursued a global
strategy to cause integrated global harm. The plaintiffs then pointed out
that the particular rules at issue-those condemning the maintenance of
hard-core pricing cartels-are shared by virtually every antitrust
system.' 7 In this sense, they noted, the case was quite unlike the more
common cases in which the application of domestic law in litigation
involving cross-border elements creates a substantive conflict with the
law of another jurisdiction. 8 Given the shared norm against hard-core
price-fixing, plaintiffs argued, there was no such conflict and therefore
no reason not to permit recovery by foreign as well as domestic
purchasers. "
14. The cartels had therefore been prosecuted in the United States, and had been sued by
private plaintiffs whose purchase transactions had taken place there. For discussion of the
prosecution of the vitamins cartel, see Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and
the Coming of International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001).
15. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffrnann-La Roche Ltd., 388 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
16. Id at 344. ("On this view of the alleged facts, appellants claim that the foreign plaintiffs
were injured as a direct result of the increases in United States prices even though they bought
vitamins abroad.").
17. Brief of Respondent, at 5, 47, 50, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
18. See infra Part I.B. 1 for further discussion of this point.
19. In this sense, the plaintiffs sought application of U.S. domestic law almost as a stand-in
for world antitrust law. See Ralf Michaels & Daniel Zimmer, US-Gerichte als
Weltkartellgerichte?, 24 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS
(IPRAX) 451 (2004).
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The plaintiffs in the vitamins case and the other global cartel cases
argued that U.S. jurisdiction over the claims of foreign purchasers
would enhance global competition regulation. This argument regarding
the role of U.S. litigation built on an earlier decision of the Supreme
Court.z0 In that case, the Court considered whether a foreign sovereign
was entitled to initiate private litigation pursuant to U.S. antitrust law.
Although the case turned primarily on whether the relevant
jurisdictional provision applied to sovereign plaintiffs,2 ' the decision
incorporated a policy argument for broad jurisdiction over foreign
claims:
[A]n exclusion of all foreign plaintiffs would lessen the deterrent
effect of treble damages. The conspiracy alleged by the
respondents in this case operated domestically as well as
internationally. If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a
remedy for their antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in
this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into
anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in
the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort
abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home. If, on the
other hand, potential antitrust violators must take into account
the full costs of their conduct, American consumers are benefited
by the maximum deterrent effect of treble damages upon all
potential violators.22
In the Pfizer case itself, the foreign government had suffered
damages in U.S.-based transactions; thus, the case addressed whether
foreign plaintiffs should be able to sue, but not directly whether foreign
transactions could be the basis of a suit. Nevertheless, this passage
articulates a link between private enforcement in U.S. courts and the
20. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
21. Id. at 312 (noting that whether a foreign nation is entitled to initiate a private action in
U.S. court depends on whether it is a "person" as defined in section 4 of the Clayton Act).
22. Id. at 315. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Burger criticized this focus on the deterrent
function of civil actions. See id. at 329 (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that the goal of treble
damages is primarily remedial, and that "[t]o allow foreign sovereigns who were clearly not the
intended beneficiaries of this remedy to nevertheless invoke it" reverses the priority of remedial
and deterrent functions).
20061 259
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effective regulation, from the perspective of U.S. consumers, of cross-
border cartels.23
The recent generation of global cartel claims builds upon this
foundation, expanding the question of deterrence to consider not just its
benefit to U.S. consumers, but its benefit to consumers in all markets.
The global aim of the proposed regulatory strategy emerged particularly
clearly in some of the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in
the vitamin litigation. These suggested that the cartel's cross-border
arrangements required cross-border regulatory solutions-that where
the economic markets for particular products are not separable along
geographic lines, regulatory efforts too must be directed at a more
broadly defined market. 24 They then proposed that permitting foreign
plaintiffs to sue in the United States, not only for harm suffered in U.S.-
based transactions, but also for harm suffered in foreign purchase
transactions, would achieve optimal deterrence levels.25 This conclusion
rested on the argument that the treble damages awardable in the United
States would raise the total damages payable by cartels to an amount
sufficient to achieve deterrence.26
This argument of course draws on the argument articulated in
Pfizer-that underenforcement in the country on whose market a
particular transaction occurs can lead to underdeterrence of cartel
behavior overall, creating a regulatory gap. However, it expands
Pfizer's focus on the benefit to U.S. consumers, considering more
consciously the benefit to other markets as well. For example, the
23. See generally Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International
Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 298-99 (2002) (discussing the deterrence
argument forwarded in Pfizer, and describing legislative history echoing that regulatory goal).
24. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents at *12, F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
25. The court below had endorsed this conclusion. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2003):
We are persuaded that, if foreign plaintiffs could not enforce the antitrust laws with
respect to the foreign effects of anticompetitive behavior, global conspiracy would be
underdeterred, since the perpetrator might well retain the benefits that the conspiracy
accrued abroad. There would be an incentive to engage in global conspiracies, because,
even if the conspirator has to disgorge his U.S. profits in suits by domestic plaintiffs, he
would very possibly retain his foreign profits, which may make up for his U.S. liability.
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars, supra note 24, at *12 n.11; Brief Amici Curiae
of Professors Darren Bush et al. in Support of Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. 155
(No. 03-724) (outlining economic data showing that making treble damages available to foreign
purchasers would help approach an optimal level of deterrence); Brief of Amici Curiae
Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz & Peter R. Orszag in Support of Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La
Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724) (accord).
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economic data supporting the plaintiffs' argument related in part to the
regulatory gaps created by the situation in developing countries, where
insufficient antitrust regimes may leave anti-competitive conduct
entirely unregulated.27 This observation, while made to support the
notion of global underdeterrence, implies that access to U.S. courts
would be of particular benefit to plaintiffs in developing countries.28
Moreover, the arguments specifically noted that the benefits of
enhanced deterrence would ensure better regulation of markets
everywhere-in other words, they perceived the proposed regulatory
solution as one that would enhance the enforcement of a shared standard
of conduct for the benefit of consumers worldwide.
In sum, then, these cases suggest that there is a global regulatory
interest in permitting private actions based on foreign purchase
transactions to proceed in domestic courts. As in the public law context,
such actions would utilize national judicial resources to improve global
compliance with a shared regulatory norm.
2. Regulation of Global Securities Offerings
A second class of transnational regulatory cases arises out of cross-
border securities fraud. Like the global cartel cases, these involve claims
by foreign purchasers for damage incurred in transactions occurring
outside the United States-here, purchases of securities, on foreign
exchanges, at prices artificially inflated by fraudulent
misrepresentations. 29 Like the cartel cases, they indicate that linked
global markets require new solutions to economic misconduct.
27. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Darren Bush et al., supra note 26 (discussing
the impact of the vitamins cartel on less developed countries as well as on the United States and
other developed markets); Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 911, 923 (2003) (noting that many developing countries lack either antitrust laws or the
resources to enforce existing laws); John M. Connor, Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and
Deterrence of Private International Cartels (Purdue Univ. Dep't of Agric. Econ., Staff Paper 04-
08, 2004), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf view.pl?paperid=14761&ftype=.pdf
(arguing that jurisdiction in the United States over such cases is necessary to increase global
deterrence to an acceptable level).
28. For a discussion of regulatory impact on developing countries, see Margaret Levenstein
and Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries:
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801 (2004).
29. In other words, they do not present the more typical factual scenario in which a foreign
plaintiff purchases securities directly on a U.S. exchange.
2006]
262 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
One representative case, In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation,°
involved a Netherlands corporation with securities listed on both U.S.
and foreign exchanges. Plaintiffs alleged that officers of the company
made misrepresentations in filings with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and also in a variety of press releases,
public statements and news articles published both in the United States
and elsewhere.3" The plaintiff group, which included purchasers who
had bought their shares on foreign exchanges as well as some who had
purchased on the U.S. market,32 argued that these misrepresentations
had inflated the price at which they purchased their shares.33 The
plaintiffs noted specifically the interconnected nature of the different
financial markets on which the issuer's securities traded, stating that
"Baan shares trade in tandem on the world's markets."34 In their view,
then, harm and effect in the different jurisdictions were intertwined,
with two particular implications. First, fraudulent statements made
outside the United States would affect prices on U.S. exchanges as well,
causing harm within the United States.35 Second, misstatements
included in filings with the SEC would affect prices on foreign
exchanges, causing harm to those who purchased the issuer's securities
abroad. On the latter basis, plaintiffs drew on the "fraud on the market"
theory, under which plaintiffs can establish a presumption of reliance on
misstatements made in public filings. 36 They suggested a sort of "fraud
on the global market" theory: even if they did not rely directly on the
fraudulent SEC filings (for instance, by reading an SEC filing that
induced them to purchase securities abroad), the statements in those
filings would necessarily have affected the price of shares in the foreign
markets.37
30. In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).
31. Id. at 6.
32. Shares had been purchased on NASDAQ, the Amsterdam stock exchange, and the
Frankfurt and other German stock exchanges. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. ("[T]he defendants' [foreign] acts had an effect in the United States because Baan
shares trade in tandem on the world's markets, and therefore the value of Baan's shares owned by
United States residents was affected.").
36. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988) ("[I]n an open and developed
securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business.").
37. See In re Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (citing Basic v. Levinson). As I discuss in Part II,
the artificial separation of these two implications is necessitated by current jurisdictional rules
applicable in securities cases.
[Vol. 46:2
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The interconnectedness of the financial markets that the plaintiffs
described in In re Baan is widely recognized. In many other cases,
foreign purchasers of securities have noted the "'seamless, worldwide
market' for [issuers'] securities,"38 or the "unitary nature" of foreign and
U.S. markets.39 It seems likely that some issuers will take deliberate
advantage of that interconnectedness.4" In one recent complaint, a mixed
group of foreign and U.S. plaintiffs described the efforts of a Hong
Kong issuer to coordinate its public offering on the Hong Kong and
New York markets, alleging that the issuer had used misstatements in
the latter to increase demand for its securities in the former.4 ' More
often, strategies pursued in one jurisdiction will simply have overflow
effects in other markets. In a case involving a German pharmaceuticals
company, foreign purchasers of securities joined a class action alleging
fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the potential of a particular
drug.42 They noted that "defendants considered the success of [the drug
in the United States] important,"43 explaining the benefit the defendants
38. Tri Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
39. Kaufnan v. Campeau Corp., 744 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ohio 1990); see also In re Gaming
Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Due to the efficiencies of market
pricing and the ever-present possibility of arbitrage, the price of [defendant's] stock on the
[Toronto Stock Exchange] and the NASDAQ unsurprisingly moved in tandem during the class
period."); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Inevitably, there was a
direct linkage between the prices of the ADRs representing five ordinary shares and the prices of
the single ordinary shares themselves. If the ordinary share price fell on the London Exchange,
the market price of an ADR would decrease in similar manner, and vice versa."). The linkage is
particularly clear in the case of American Depository Receipts, since each ADR represents a
certain number of foreign shares, but exists with respect to any securities trading on multiple
efficient markets. In both cases, misstatements made in one market will inevitably affect the
other(s) as well.
40. On the economic benefits that issuers seek from cross-listing, see Amir N. Licht, Legal
Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 195, 200-202 (2004); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top? The Impact
of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780-82 (2002) (noting that issuers also use cross-listing as a bonding
mechanism: by signaling their willingness to subject themselves to U.S. enforcement standards,
they can achieve a higher market valuation).
41. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, In re
China Life Ins. Co. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-02112 (S.D.N.Y 2006), 2006 WL 551381
(describing the way in which the issuer "intentionally entangled its American conduct with its
listing on a foreign exchange"). The merits of this allegation have not been determined.
42. In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
The misstatements alleged related to early assurances regarding the drug's prospects, later
statements regarding the risk of product liability litigation, and the failure to set aside reserves for
possible losses.
43. Id. at *17.
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derived from the misrepresentations made in the United States. Because
these statements affected all of the trading markets in the issuer's
securities," however, the conduct in question led to a global harm. This
type of securities case, then, suggests precisely the same
underdeterrence argument that the antitrust cases raise explicitly: even if
shareholders who purchase in U.S. markets can bring private actions
under U.S. law, the total damages recoverable might be insufficient
adequately to deter the conduct in question.
One difference between this category of cases and the antitrust cases
is that there are fewer shared norms in the area of securities regulation. 5
To the extent there are such norms, however, these cases present the
same argument for recognizing jurisdiction in domestic courts. Some
cases have involved conduct that violates both U.S. and the relevant
foreign country's securities rules 46 -but substantive agreement in the
two (or few) countries involved in a particular case does not necessarily
signal broader international acceptance of the norms involved. A few
cases, however, have involved conduct that violates a rule reflecting a
higher level of convergence across disparate systems.47 In the Bayer
case discussed above, for example, plaintiffs alleged that the company
had failed to establish reserves as required not only by U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles but also by International Accounting
Standards.4" These constitute a core set of standards for application in
cross-border transactions, and have been adopted not only by Germany,
Bayer's home jurisdiction and the location of the foreign purchase
transactions, but by many other countries as well.4 9 Where the
44. Id. at *18.
45. See further discussion infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 345 (D. Md.
2004) (noting that the defendant's accounting of promotional allowances violated U.S. and also
Dutch (the issuer's home-country) GAAP).
47. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting, in the
course of a personal jurisdiction analysis, that fraudulent affirmative misrepresentations "would
violate the disclosure requirements of any securities regulatory regime") (emphasis added).
48. In re Bayer, 2004 WL 2190357, at *6. For another case alleging violation of International
Accounting Standards, see City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp.,
399 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2005) (alleging that defendants had failed to record loss contingencies
as required under an International Accounting Standard applicable in Japan).
49. The International Accounting Standards Committee, formed by the accounting standards-
setters of ten countries in 1973, adopted international accounting standards (now International
Financial Reporting Standards) in 1999. They were subsequently endorsed by the International
Organisation of Securities Commissioners in 2000 and recommended for use in all cross-border
offerings. See Commission Regulation 1606/2002 on the Application of International Accounting
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substantive norm to be applied is indeed accepted this broadly across
systems, securities cases too fall into the category of transnational
regulatory actions serving the global economic welfare."
3. Private Claims to Recover Lost Tax Revenue
In a series of cases addressing the financial consequences of cigarette
smuggling, foreign governments sought civil damages in suits under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).51 The
plaintiffs were Canada, the European Community,52 Honduras, Ecuador,
Belize and political subdivisions of the Republic of Colombia. 3 In each
case, the defendants were tobacco companies alleged to have
participated in the smuggling of cigarettes into the respective
jurisdictions. While these cases differ from antitrust and securities
litigation in that they are brought by states rather than by private
plaintiffs, they raise similar questions regarding the utilization of civil
actions in domestic courts to serve international regulatory purposes.
In the Canadian case, which was the first to reach the federal courts
of appeals, the Canadian government argued that the defendants had
established a cross-border smuggling scheme whose purpose and effect
was to deprive the government of duties and taxes that otherwise would
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, 1-4 (adopting international accounting standards within Europe);
Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder Value
Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 277, 283 (2002) (describing the changes made to
Korean market regulation, including a revision of accounting standards "to bring them into
substantial compliance with International Accounting Standards"); Bernhard Grossfeld, Global
Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 275-76 (2000).
50. See Edward F. Greene & Linda C. Quinn, International Securities Markets 2003:
Emerging Best Practices for a Rapidly Evolving Regulatory Scheme, 1372 PRACTISING L. INST.
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 561, 564-65 (2003) (discussing the increasing
convergence of both accounting and disclosure standards related to securities offerings).
51. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated by 544
U.S. 1012 (2005), reinstated by 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005); European Community v. Japan
Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded by 544 U.S. 1012
(2005), reinstated by 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 1045 (2006); Republic
of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253 (1lth Cir. 2003); Attorney General of
Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); Republic of
Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
52. The European Community's cases against Japan Tobacco, RJR Nabisco, and Philip
Morris were consolidated and decided in Japan Tobacco, 186 F. Supp. 2d 231.
53. State-analogous departments within the country, not the Republic of Colombia itself,
joined the European Community in its complaint.
2006] 265
266 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
have been payable upon the sale of the cigarettes. 4 (The government
also argued that the scheme had caused additional damages by requiring
it to expend funds on enforcement activity intended to end the unlawful
behavior.)55 The Canadian action therefore linked the government's
claim for civil damages under RICO directly to the nonpayment of
applicable taxes in Canada. Although the governments in the later cases
argued that their claims were not solely revenue-based,56 the respective
courts characterized them similarly as cases seeking lost revenue. In the
Honduras litigation, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit Court concluded
that the action "fundamentally deal[t] with the adjudication of foreign
tax claims."57
Like the other cases described above, these deal with cross-border
misconduct. In the Canadian case, plaintiffs alleged that the smuggling
scheme originated in Canada58 and involved first the export of cigarettes
into the United States and later the export of raw tobacco to Puerto
Rico, in both cases for eventual smuggling back into Canada. 9 Plaintiffs
also alleged that a U.S. company within the defendant's corporate group
participated in the distribution of the cigarettes, and that the defendants
used the U.S. mail and wire system in implementing their scheme.6" The
European Community case involved similar cross-border activity: the
plaintiffs alleged a "massive... global scheme"'" that included the use of
smuggling channels "by way of countries such as Panama and Cyprus"
as well as "secret corporations and/or bank accounts located in money-
laundering havens such as Panama and Switzerland."62 Again, the
54. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 108; Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). Certain individual participants in the
smuggling scheme had already pled guilty to related criminal violations.
55. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 108.
56. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 76-79, European Community v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-7330, 02-7325).
57. Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2003);
see also RJR Nabisco, 355 F.3d at 132 (describing the EC's claims as "markedly similar" to
Canada's and stating that they arose "exclusively from tax-related laws and costs").
58. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant the Attorney General of Canada at 5-6, Attorney Gen. of
Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-7972) (stating
that following a substantial tax increase in Canada, the CEO of R.J. Reynolds' Canadian
subsidiary "demanded that his staff devise a way to sell more Canadian cigarettes").
59. Id. at 8-10.
60. Id.
61. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, RJR Nabsico, 355 F.3d 123 (2004) (Nos. 02-7330,
02-7325).
62. Id. at 12.
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plaintiffs alleged that defendants had used the mails and wires of the
United States, and that the illegal conduct taking place within the United
States was "the root of a global problem. '63 The remaining cases in this
group, brought by the governments of Ecuador and Honduras, alleged
the use of various free trade zones to bring the goods to the respective
markets.64
As with the antitrust cases, the point is not merely that the conduct in
question crossed borders, but that the global nature of the money
transfer system created a regulatory gap. Some of the corporations and
individuals involved in the scheme were prosecuted, under criminal
RICO as well as wire flraud and money laundering statutes; however, the
plaintiffs in these cases argued that civil litigation in U.S. courts was
necessary in order successfully to combat the misconduct involved. The
European Community stated in its brief, for instance, that "only the U.S.
courts are situated, equipped, and empowered to enjoin" the conduct in
question.65 In the view of the plaintiffs, the shared interest in preventing
cross-border tax evasion justified this assistance.
The revenue claims of foreign governments, while different from
claims of private plaintiffs under antitrust and securities laws, therefore
make analogous arguments for the involvement of domestic courts. In
particular, they focus on the role of U.S. civil litigation as part of the
global regulatory system. The brief for the European Community in the
consolidated cases before the Second Circuit presented this argument
particularly clearly. The brief discussed explicitly the role of civil
actions in U.S. courts as one of a larger set of transnational enforcement
strategies. It suggested that RICO-and, more particularly, its private
attorney general mechanism-was intended to be used not only purely
domestically but also "to pursue transnational organized crime directed
against foreign allies."66 In support of this suggestion, the brief cited at
length the legislative history of the more recent PATRIOT Act,
including a statement assuring that "our allies will have access to our
courts and the use of our laws if they are the victims of smuggling,
fraud, money laundering, or terrorism."67 This argument points to the
63. Id. at 9.
64. Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1255 (1 1th Cir. 2003);
Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
65. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9, R.JR Nabisco, 355 F.3d 123 (Nos. 02-7330, 02-7325).
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 30-32 (citing statement of Senator Kerry); see also id. at 43 (citing a related
statement noting that: "Since some of the money-laundering in the world today also defrauds
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willingness of U.S. legislators to leverage the deterrent function of
private actions under U.S. law for the benefit of the global community.68
B. Situating Regulatory Cases Within the Tradition of
Transnational Litigation
Because they concern transactions occurring outside the United
States, the global antitrust and securities cases fit within the rubric of
extraterritorial regulation-that is, they raise the question whether the
legislative acts of the United States were intended to reach conduct or
transactions taking place outside U.S. borders. And, as Part III describes
in more detail, the courts have indeed treated them as classic
extraterritoriality cases, invoking traditional extraterritoriality analysis.
The cases I describe as transnational regulatory litigation nevertheless
differ from classic extraterritoriality litigation in two regards: first, the
shared nature of the norm they seek to apply, and second, the global
nature of the regulatory benefit they promise.
1. Extraterritoriality and Conflict of Regulatory Laws
Traditional extraterritoriality analysis flows from a principle of
international law: because all sovereign nations enjoy exclusive
authority to regulate within their territorial borders, no nation will apply
its laws to conduct that occurs in another.69 Historically, in accordance
with this principle, regulation of extraterritorial conduct was viewed as
illegitimate. Thus, U.S. courts applied domestic regulatory law only to
conduct occurring within the United States.70 Over time, this strict
construction eroded as nations recognized the validity under
international law of regulating foreign conduct when that conduct had
foreign governments, it would be hostile to the intent of [the PATRIOT Act] for us to interject
into the statute any rule of construction of legislative language which would in any way limit our
foreign allies' access to our courts to battle against money laundering.").
68. Congress has expressed a similar intention in connection with human rights litigation. The
Torture Victims Protection Act enacted in 1994 authorizes suits in U.S. courts by foreign as well
as U.S. victims of torture, reflecting the legislative belief that in certain circumstances the use of
domestic courts is appropriate in service of a global good. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
69. See F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 30-31 (describing the roots of jurisdictional law in territorial sovereignty).
70. The classic articulation of this principle is found in Justice Holmes' opinion in an early
antitrust case: "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
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substantial domestic effects.7 In U.S. courts, the focus in defining the
reach of regulatory law shifted from analyzing international law limits
on prescriptive jurisdiction to determining whether Congress had in fact
intended domestic regulatory law to reach particular foreign conduct.72
While courts begin with a presumption against extraterritorial effect
when applying regulatory law,73 that presumption can be overcome
where Congressional intent to reach foreign conduct is inferred. The
determination of whether regulatory law was intended to reach
particular conduct therefore requires a fact-based analysis. In a typical
case involving the application of domestic rules to conduct touching
multiple jurisdictions, this analysis begins by establishing the various
links that the conduct and the actors have to the different countries
involved.74  While some courts have held that U.S. legislative
jurisdiction extends to all conduct causing the requisite level of effects
in the United States, others have added to the jurisdictional analysis one
form or another of balancing test. These tests are intended to account for
the competing interests of other nations and ensure deference to those
nations when the conduct's effect on the United States is insufficient, in
light of those interests, to justify regulation.75
71. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(adopting an effects test in the United States); Case 89/85 Osakeyhti6 v. Commission of the
European Communities, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (In re Wood Pulp) (adopting an effects test in the
European Union). While the precise scope of effects jurisdiction remains the subject of debate, it
is widely recognized. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (5th ed. 2002)
(discussing the conditions under which effects-based jurisdiction may be exercised consistent
with international law).
72. As one commentator has noted: "What began.. .as a prohibition against the perceived
violation of international law through extraterritorial regulation became simply a legal test for
subject matter jurisdiction." Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome ": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 607 (1990); see also Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 1, 10 (1992) (noting the link between the international law principle and the process of
statutory construction, reflected in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118 (1804): "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if
any other possible construction remains.").
73. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (reaffirming the
presumption against extraterritoriality); see also William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998); Turley, supra note
72.
74. See David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Challenge to National
Regulatory Systems, 26 HouS. J. INT'L L. 287, 290-91 (2004).
75. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (rejecting such interest-
balancing unless a foreign state compelled the conduct in question).
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As these efforts to restrain the reach of regulatory law reflect, the
extraterritorial application of domestic law creates substantial conflict
between nations. However, the primary source of that conflict is
differences in substance between the law applied and the law of the
other country or countries involved, particularly when conduct
permitted where it occurred is prohibited where it has effect. Major
conflicts resulted when the United States attempted to regulate
competition-related arrangements that were lawful in other countries,
for instance, or to prosecute cross-border insider trading at a time when
other countries did not regulate such conduct.76 The balancing tests
proposed for use in extraterritoriality analysis reflect this focus as well:
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, for instance, includes a section designed to avoid the substantive
conflicts that often attend overlapping exercises of jurisdiction.77 In the
cases I describe as transnational regulatory litigation, however, the
regulatory community shares the rule applied; thus, the cases do not
present the situation where conduct would be permitted in a foreign
jurisdiction but forbidden under U.S. law.7" (While it is true that
differences in the procedural law to be applied can cause conflict as
well,79 that is a second-order conflict that I address separately in Part
III.) Transnational regulatory cases therefore do not present the core
concern raised by traditional extraterritoriality cases."°
76. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for
Reasonableness, 245 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 54-55 (1994-I) (discussing past controversies over
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in some such cases).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(3) (1987); see also id. § 403(3) cmt. e.
78. Early discussions in fact suggested that the exercise of effects-based jurisdiction would be
consistent with international law if the substance of the claim was recognized by the broader
community of states. See Lowenfeld, supra note 76, at 65.
79. But see id. at 192 (noting that objections based on procedural conflict are sometimes
surrogates for objections to expansive application of substantive law).
80. Cf ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE
USE IT 77 (1994) (discussing shared values such as standards against certain criminal behavior,
and comparing to extraterritorial regulation of restrictive trade practices: "[T]he key to the issue
lies in the protection of common values rather than the invocation of sovereignty for its own sake.
The fight against restrictive practices, which harm the consumer and keep prices high, in my view
deserves international solidarity, along with the fight against common criminality. The exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to that end seems to me as acceptable as its exercise in the other non-
territorial bases of jurisdiction.").
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2. The Global Benefits of Transnational Regulatory Cases
As I have described above, transnational regulatory cases seek access
to U.S. courts specifically as a means of addressing global harms.
Significant arguments support this use of civil litigation. In an era in
which unchecked corporate power often results in economic misconduct
on a global scale, civil proceedings in U.S. courts could help provide
meaningful regulation of economically harmful behavior.8 Particularly
in developing countries, where the challenges of global economic harm
have not yet been adequately addressed, such assistance would be
significant.82 In this regard, the litigation promises to mobilize available
resources to address a problem that concerns the international
community at large.
Furthermore, certain types of transnational regulatory cases promote
procedural efficiency as well. Most of the antitrust and securities cases
described above involved plaintiff groups that were, due to the
jurisdictional challenges presented by the foreign claims, ultimately
split into one U.S. and one foreign group. When the foreign group
includes plaintiffs from jurisdictions that permit private claims, this
fragmentation of the class means that the same transactions and conduct
are litigated in more than one proceeding. The vitamins cartel, for
example, gave rise to private damages claims in the United Kingdom as
81. See First, supra note 14 (noting that many of the participants in the vitamin cartel were
repeat offenders and detailing the economic damage the cartel caused); Philip J. Nichols,
Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 257 (1999) (discussing economic harm caused by corporate bribery); Robert A. Prentice,
The Internet and Its Challenges For the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 263 (1999) (discussing economic harm caused by securities fraud); see also Sarah H.
Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L.
REV. 971, 973 (2004) (speaking of human rights violations rather than economic misconduct, but
noting that "corporations now are scouring the far corners of the earth in search of profits and
entering into business arrangements as they never have before"); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate
Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 750-52
(2002) (noting how transnational litigation has played a role in checking the human-rights abuses
of corporations).
82. See Eleanor M. Fox, Global Problems in a World of National Law, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV.
11 (1999) (identifying improvements in the enforcement regimes of less developed and
developing countries as a benefit of a more cosmopolitan approach to international antitrust);
Pamela Sittenfeld, International Cooperation Between Developed and Developing Countries, in
2003 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 685, 692 (Barry Hawk ed., 2003) (noting
that competition agencies in developing countries often lack the "credibility and independence"
necessary to impose penalties with a sufficiently deterrent effect on companies). See generally
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1956).
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well as the United States.83 As other countries increasingly allow private
actions under regulatory law,84 the result could be the dispersal in
various national courts of cases that all address one single instance of
conduct. The consolidation of such litigation would improve global
procedural efficiency.85
II. THE APPLICATION OF JURISDICTIONAL RULES IN
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY CASES
Transnational regulatory cases have met the same criticism leveled at
transnational public law litigation-that they arrogate power to the
courts of particular countries in a way that violates the international
jurisdictional framework, and therefore infringe the sovereignty of other
countries. Because the regulatory cases apply domestic rather than
international law, they are also criticized as vehicles for the illegitimate
application of national law to foreign conduct. This Part addresses these
jurisdictional challenges to transnational regulatory litigation. It
considers first the judicial disposition of the cases, examining the
jurisdictional rules the courts apply to resolve the international conflicts
presented. While the specific jurisdictional rules vary with the subject
matter of the cases, they have in common a view of global regulation as
compartmentalized along lines of territorial sovereignty. It then
critiques the jurisdictional analysis on the basis that it fails to consider
the substantive regulatory benefits that transnational litigation can
confer.
83. See Provimi Ltd. v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA, [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm) (Eng.).
84. See discussion infra Part HI.A.2 (noting that private actions under regulatory law are
becoming more common outside the United States).
85. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Economists Joseph P. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag, supra
note 26, at 11-12:
High fixed costs of bringing antitrust actions mean that even if a developing country had
the administrative and legal framework with which to bring antitrust actions, were
recovery limited to damages within the country, it would not be economically
practicable to bring antitrust actions. Efficient deterrence requires the concentration of
antitrust actions in the economies most affected.
U.S. courts need not be the only situs for such litigation. See Ralf Michaels, Territorial
Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105, 126 (Piet Jan Slot &
Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004). Currently, however, the U.S. courts have the most substantial
experience in addressing private attorney general claims. Moreover, as long as remedies and
procedural rules differ across legal systems, plaintiffs may seek U.S. fora in preference to others
in order to obtain treble damages, more flexible procedural rules, or both. I discuss problems
related to this situation in Part III.A.3.
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A. Jurisdictional Law Applied to Transnational Regulatory Cases
1. Antitrust Litigation
The global cartel cases presented a question of statutory
interpretation: whether the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982 (FTAIA),86 a statute intended to clarify the reach of U.S.
antitrust law to export commerce, barred jurisdiction over the claims of
purchasers harmed in foreign transactions. The relevant provision of the
FTAIA confers jurisdiction over foreign conduct involving foreign
commerce only if that conduct has a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on U.S. markets, and that effect gives rise to a claim
under the Sherman Act.87 Because the cartels in question had harmed
U.S. markets, the first part of this test was satisfied in each case; as to
the second part, however, the appellate courts hearing the cases were
divided. Some held that the foreign purchasers had suffered harm
arising from the cartel's foreign effects alone, and that their claims
therefore had not satisfied the jurisdictional test.88 Others held that as
long as the same conduct that harmed the foreign purchasers had caused
effects within the United States, the claims of foreign purchasers fell
within U.S. jurisdiction.89 In the vitamins litigation, the Supreme Court
largely resolved this question of interpretation.9" It predicated its
opinion on the assumption that the effects caused by the cartel in U.S.
markets were independent of those caused in foreign markets.9 ' It then
held that because the harm suffered by foreign purchasers arose from
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
87. Id. I analyze this provision in more detail in Hannah L. Buxbaum, Jurisdictional Conflict
in Global Antitrust Enforcement, 16 LOYOLA CONS. L. REV. 365 (2004), and Hannah L.
Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1095 (2004). See also Salil K.
Mehra, "A" is For Anachronism: The FTAIA Meets the World Trading System, 107 DICK. L.
REV. 763 (2003) (analyzing competing constructions of the FTAIA).
88. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeseskap A.S. v. HeereMac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2001).
89. See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
90. I co-authored an amicus brief in that litigation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors
Ralf Michaels, Hannah Buxbaum and Horatia Muir Watt in Support of Respondents, F.
Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), available at 2004
WL 542780.
91. F Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 158 (2004). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
validated this assumption on remand. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (Empagran
I/), 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (viewing the harm suffered in each purchase transaction as
stemming from price increases in the particular market in which that transaction took place).
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the conduct's foreign effects, and not from its domestic effects, the
claims did not meet the FTAIA's jurisdictional requirements.92
The Court examined closely the question of jurisdiction in cross-
border cases, evaluating the competing interests of other nations in
antitrust regulation. In particular, it took seriously the briefs filed by a
number of foreign governments, in which they asserted their authority
to establish their own regulatory schemes without interference from the
United States.93 The Court noted that domestic statutes should,
whenever possible, be construed to avoid interference with foreign
sovereign authority, and expressed its desire to "help[] the potentially
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony."94 Its
decision therefore rested on a view of jurisdictional authority as flowing
from the territorial allocation of power to sovereign states.
On remand, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals tested the assumption
of the Supreme Court that the effects of the cartel in the United States
were in fact independent of the effects felt in foreign markets.95 This
decision reflects even more clearly the territorial basis of the
jurisdictional analysis. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had presented
a "plausible scenario" under which maintenance of artificial prices in
the United States "might well have been a 'but-for' cause" of the
foreign purchasers' injury.96 However, it then concluded that the FTAIA
requires not merely but-for causation, but "a direct causal relationship"
between anti-competitive effects in the United States and the foreign
harm.9 7 While seemingly accepting that the vitamin market was a
"single, global market," it held that plaintiffs had established only an
indirect connection between the U.S. prices and the harm they suffered
in overseas transactions, insufficient to support U.S. jurisdiction over
92. F Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 159.
93. Amicus briefs to this effect were filed by the governments of Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
94. F Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164.
95. in Empagran II, the court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that "because vitamins are
fungible and readily transportable, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the
United States), the sellers could not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangement
and respondents would not have suffered their foreign injury." Empagran H, 417 F.3d at 1269.
96. Id. at 1270.
97. Id. at 1270-71; see also Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR nt'l, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d
700, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that sixteen of the plaintiffs could not show that higher prices
paid in U.S. graphite electrodes market "gives rise to their claims that they paid higher prices for
graphite electrodes in foreign markets"), vacated and remanded on other grounds.
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their claims.98 This decision therefore maintains an allocation of
regulatory authority according to territorial boundaries even over what
is apparently conceded to be a global market.99
2. Securities Litigation
The courts addressing the transnational securities cases engaged in a
similar territory-driven analysis. They began with the two jurisdictional
tests traditionally applied in securities cases with international elements,
designed to assess whether the events in question are sufficiently
connected to the United States to warrant the exercise of regulatory
jurisdiction.' The first is the "conduct" test, which establishes
regulatory jurisdiction based on the location of the fraudulent conduct
itself;'' the second, the "effects" test, which establishes jurisdiction
based on the location of that conduct's effects.' ° Cases in which
jurisdiction is based on conduct trigger the U.S. regulatory interest in
preventing the country from becoming a haven for fraudulent behavior
that harms investors and markets elsewhere; thus, courts look for
conduct that is more than merely preparatory to the fraud. Effects cases
trigger the U.S. regulatory interest in protecting domestic markets and
98. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271 ("Although the appellants argue that the vitamin market is
a single, global market facilitated by market division agreements so that their injuries arose from
the higher prices charged by the global conspiracy (rather than from super-competitive prices in
one particular market), they still must satisfy the FTAIA's requirement that the U.S. effects of the
conduct give rise to their claims.").
99. See Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the World, 14
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 523, 531-32 (2002) (discussing the HeereMac case in terms of the
world market presented and the clear harm in the United States). For cases outside the hard-core
cartel context, see also In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001)
(case brought by foreign purchasers of operating systems alleging monopolistic pricing); In re
Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wisc. 2000) (case brought by purchasers of
copper contracts on a London market at artificially inflated prices).
100. While some courts have adopted a sort of mixture of the two, even these nevertheless
begin analysis with a review of these doctrines.
101. A classic articulation of this standard is found in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,
722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
102. The classic articulation of this test is found in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d
Cir. 1989).
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investors from harm caused by foreign conduct; thus, courts look for
substantial and intentional domestic effects."°3
Purchasers seeking damages for harm flowing from foreign securities
transactions generally tailor their claims to the conduct test. They argue
that conduct taking place in the United States, in the form of
misrepresentations made there, materially advanced the frauds in
question."' (As discussed in Part I.A.2, these claims are often based on
a "fraud on the global market" theory, drawing on the fact that, given
efficient markets, misrepresentations made in the United States will
affect trading prices abroad as well as domestically.) Such an argument
might be sufficient to satisfy the general standards of the conduct test,
according to which U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction exists as long as
substantial activities occurred within the United States.10 5 Some courts,
however, have adopted a stricter test, requiring that the U.S.-based
conduct lead directly to the losses suffered by the foreign investors."°6
On this view, the plaintiffs must show specific reliance on
misstatements made within the United States in order to establish
reliance. Arguing that statements made in the United States necessarily
affect prices on the interconnected financial markets, in other words, is
insufficient."°7 This approach separates the U.S. and foreign markets:
103. This is a somewhat simplified statement of the jurisdictional tests. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1987).
104. See, e.g., In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the plaintiffs had conceded that the effects test would not support
jurisdiction); see also Tri Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (W.D. Pa.
2002) (action involving claims by foreign plaintiffs arising out of purchases of securities on the
London Stock Exchange, in which plaintiffs argued that misstatements in SEC filings constituted
conduct that "significantly advanced defendants' fraudulent scheme to mislead investors").
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring merely that "at
least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme" must occur within the United States).
106. See, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923-25 (E.D. Tex.
1999) ("In order to satisfy the conduct test, the Canadian Plaintiffs must demonstrate that
domestic conduct directly caused the alleged fraud.... Even if [misrepresentations made in the
United States] were indeed a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme, the Canadian Plaintiffs still
have failed to show how their losses were directly caused by these activities. Not a single
Canadian Plaintiff has alleged that he or she relied on (or was even aware of) any statements,
reports or filings which emanated from the United States."); see also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th
Cir. 1998) (comparing the various approaches to the conduct test).
107. See, e.g., In re Bayer, 2004 WL 2190357, at *18 (citing In re Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at
10). But see In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 362 (D. Md.
2004) (where, although the court does not specifically discuss the interconnectedness of securities
markets, it notes that "[i]t is well recognized that 'SEC filings generally are the type of "devices"
that a reasonable investor would rely on in purchasing securities of the filing corporation')
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plaintiffs purchasing on the U.S. markets can use the fraud on the
market theory to establish their reliance on misrepresentations, but
plaintiffs purchasing on foreign markets cannot." 8 Courts adopting this
approach have expressed the fear that if fraud on the market satisfied the
conduct test, then U.S. law would extend extraterritorially to
transactions around the world whenever fraudulent misrepresentations
were made involving jointly traded securities.0 9
In some cases, where the fraud in question occurred overseas, foreign
investors have sought the application of U.S. law on the basis of the
effects test. These claims suggest that if the same conduct that harmed
foreign markets also harms U.S. markets, then the effects felt in the
United States should be sufficient to confer jurisdiction over all claims,
including those brought by foreign purchasers. Such claims generally
founder because the courts believe that they can view effects caused
within the United States as independent of effects caused abroad. In In
re Baan, for instance, the court recognized that global trading might
cause foreign-based fraud to create "greater and more pervasive
generalized effects" in the United States, but held that no link had been
established between those effects and the claims of the foreign
plaintiffs."' These holdings separate the effects on U.S. markets from
those on foreign markets, treating the resulting harm to U.S. and foreign
investors as independent."' This approach is identical to that adopted in
the global cartel cases, as noted recently by one court:
While the Supreme Court has not commented on the conduct and
effects test in the securities law arena, it recently ruled that under
(citing Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 1995)). In In re Royal Ahold,
however, U.S.-based accounting fraud was a material part of the alleged fraud. 351 F. Supp. 2d at
362.
108. See In re Bayer, 2004 WL 2190357, at *18, noting that fraud on the market is sufficient
to establish reliance, but "cannot be used to satisfy the conduct test."
109. See Tri-Star Farms, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 579. I argue below that this concern is less
relevant when the norm to be applied is shared by other jurisdictions.
110. In re Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 11. This conclusion echoes the reasoning of the appellate
court in the Empagran litigation; see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
11. See McNamara, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (describing the foreign plaintiffs' argument as an
attempt to "bootstrap" their losses to independent American losses); see also Kaufman v.
Campeau Corp., 744 F. Supp. 808, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (considering the "unitary nature" of the
Canadian and U.S. markets as an effects question-that is, as an argument that jurisdiction over
the foreign purchasers' claims was based on the effects of the misrepresentation on U.S.
investors). The court simply held that, although the defendants' actions in Canada may indeed
have affected U.S. investors, that effect was separate from the effect on foreign purchasers and
therefore not sufficient to meet that jurisdictional test.
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the antitrust laws, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign plaintiffs' claims that are based solely on the foreign
effect of the defendant's conduct and independent from any
domestic effect caused by the defendant's conduct.'"2
It also, as in the global cartel cases, territorially segregates effects
that flow from integrated global misconduct.
3. Tax Revenue Litigation
The RICO claims in the tobacco revenue cases were based on
violations of U.S. fraud and money laundering statutes, committed in
connection with cross-border smuggling schemes. On their face, then,
the cases present the same issues as the antitrust and securities cases:
whether U.S. federal law, in this case RICO, applies to conduct with
cross-border elements. However, the "injury to business or property"
necessary to obtain civil damages for those violations stemmed from the
foreign governments' loss of duties and taxes that would otherwise have
been payable on the smuggled goods. For this reason, the courts hearing
the cases characterized the governments' claims as claims, albeit
indirect, for the payment of taxes allegedly due." 3 Seen in this light, the
cases present a different issue: whether foreign tax law should be given
effect within the United States. In answering that question, the courts
turned to another traditional jurisdictional rule-the revenue rule, which
provides that the courts of one country will not enforce tax claims, or
judgments for the payment of taxes, of another sovereign."'
The decisions traced the history of the revenue rule, noting its roots
in classic conceptions of territorial sovereignty." 5 In the case brought by
112. In reRoyalAholdN.V Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (citing F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), but distinguishing it from the case at bar).
113. See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 130-
32 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the indirect enforcement of foreign tax law and concluding that the
object of Canada's suit was to recover taxes due and compensation for additional enforcement
costs incurred in attempting to secure those taxes).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 483 (1987) ("Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments
for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states."); see also
William S. Dodge, Breaking The Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (2002); William J.
Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the
Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 265 (2000).
115. See, e.g., Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1257-58
(11th Cir. 2003) (discussing the rule's aim "to promote harmony between sovereigns by
preventing one sovereign from asserting its political will in another sovereign through actions to
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the Canadian government, for instance, the court cites as a justification
for the rule the general notion that nations can not assert their own
sovereignty within the territory of another country, and the concomitant
principle that one country need not further the governmental interests of
another. 16 The courts recognized the discretionary nature of the rule,
acknowledging that U.S. courts can choose, in light of the need for
international comity and cooperation between countries, to give effect to
a foreign claim."7 While conceding that in these particular cases the
foreign taxes in question (intended to deter smoking, particularly among
youth) would not likely offend U.S. policies,'18 they nevertheless
concluded that inquiries into the consistency of foreign tax laws with
local policy were too "sensitive and difficult" for courts to undertake." 9
Thus, in holding that the revenue rule barred the foreign governments
from recovering civil damages in U.S. court, the courts privileged a
view based on the territorial sovereignty of individual nations.' °
In sum, while the jurisdictional framework has stretched to
accommodate the increasingly cross-border nature of most economic
activity, it remains anchored in territoriality.'2 ' While the particular
enforce its revenue laws."). But see Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos. Inc., 188 F. Supp.
2d 1359, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (framing the question almost exclusively as one of separation of
powers: "To reiterate, this Court is less concerned about 'embarrassing' Ecuador and is more
concerned with encroaching on Legislative and Executive functions.").
116. See R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 111-12; accord European Cmty. v. RJR Nabsico, Inc.,
355 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2004).
117. The revenue rule is a discretionary doctrine, limited by the public policy of the forum
state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483
(1987) (U.S. courts "are not required" to recognize foreign tax claims).
118. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 113.
119. Id. at 112; see R.JR Nabisco, 355 F.3d at 131 (noting that "claims by foreign sovereigns
invoking their tax statutes may embroil the courts in an evaluation of the foreign nation's social
policies, an inquiry that can be embarrassing to that nation and damaging to the forum state"); cf
Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, supra note 4, at 2354-55 (pointing out that U.S.
courts had historically decided "public, state-to-state issues" that today might be deemed
unsuitable for adjudication). The decisions do also recognize that the rule has taken on
"constitutional significance" through the separation of powers doctrine.
120. While the courts hearing these cases acknowledged that Congress had recognized
RICO's potential as a means of combating global crime, they held that neither RICO itself nor
subsequent legislation had preempted the revenue rule. See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing possible
preemption by RICO); R.JR Nabisco, 355 F.3d at 132-34 (discussing possible preemption by the
PATRIOT Act).
121. See generally Michaels, supra note 85 (describing the way in which concepts of
territoriality remain but have been "made flexible"); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (2002) (challenging the continued viability of territory-
based jurisdictional rules).
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rationales underlying these cases vary with the different substantive
fields regulated, each is rooted in a traditional understanding of
sovereignty as power over a geographical area. In this respect, as I argue
below, they fail to take account of valid arguments for a more global
regulatory role for domestic courts.
B. Criticism of the Jurisdictional Rules
As discussions of transnational public law litigation make clear,
traditional jurisdictional rules are in many ways ill suited to deal with
global cases. Indeed, proponents of an expanded role for domestic
courts embrace litigation in national courts precisely for its
transcendence of static norms of territorialism and jurisdiction. Consider
the following, from an academic proponent of transnational human
rights litigation:
Ultimately, the torture cases give us a glimpse into the
imperatives of a future in which law-including private law-is
increasingly cosmopolitan. Here, as the torture cases and the
surrounding debates reveal, the limitations of the traditional
conception of binding law come to seem pressing to judges and
others faced with a world where legal problems are profoundly
multi-jurisdictional in nature. The task of the advocate, the judge,
and the law-maker no longer seems adequately captured-if it
ever was-by the notion of discrete mutually exclusive spheres
of binding law, conjoined through a set of rules premised on
conflict and choice. And indeed, what the torture cases show is a
subtle, yet distinct, move away from this model and towards a
more multi-faceted integrative understanding of sources and a
broader persuasive approach to authority. 122
One can observe similar trends in the context of economic regulation.
The extraterritoriality jurisprudence that courts apply today in cross-
border cases was itself a jurisdictional innovation, reacting to the
divergence of conduct and effect in the era of international
transactions.123 But because it remains rooted in notions of territorial
sovereignty, it is simply not well suited to cases that involve forms of
122. Mayo Moran, An Uncivil Action: The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law, in
TORTURE AS TORT 661, 683 (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
123. See Turley, supra note 72, at 650-51 (noting that the rise in extraterritorial regulation
itself followed an appreciation of the increasingly global nature of business transactions).
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global harm in which both the conduct and its effects are felt
simultaneously in many jurisdictions-harm that, in a sense, does not
merely cross borders but transcends them. This is why cases involving
Internet-based activity, for instance, have proved problematic for
traditional jurisdictional law.1"4 For similar reasons, cases involving
economic misconduct that leverages the global nature of markets, and
relies on the linkage of effects across jurisdictions, fall outside the class
of cases that extraterritoriality doctrine best addresses.
1. Critique of the Conduct and Effects Tests Used in Antitrust and
Securities Cases
The jurisdictional analysis applied in the transnational regulatory
cases is in some respects commendable. Particularly in the global cartel
cases, the courts-most notably the Supreme Court-focused clearly on
the international law backdrop to the task of statutory interpretation.125
At the same time, however, the reliance on principles of territorial
sovereignty prevented a fair assessment of the arguments for using
adjudication in the United States as a tool of global regulation. In the
vitamins case, for instance, the courts adopted an artificial view of the
cartel's activity. The defendants had implemented a single, global
strategy, violating a shared norm against hard-core cartelization, and
had thereby harmed competitive conditions worldwide. Moreover, the
plaintiffs had presented a plausible argument that this type of harm
would be insufficiently deterred if foreign purchasers could not litigate
their claims in U.S. courts.'26 In using territory-based categories to
address that conduct, the Court failed to consider fully the questions
about global regulation that the plaintiffs' arguments presented.'27 While
its analysis was sensitive to the foreign relations issues raised in the
124. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716-17 (D. Md. 2001)
(discussing the status of foreign purchasers who bought directly from defendant over the Internet,
and noting that in that context "the drawing of a distinction for jurisdictional purposes on the
basis of geographical boundaries seems somewhat archaic"). See generally David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951 (2005).
125. See Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels, supra note 87, at 1099-1100 (noting the
improvement in this regard over such decisions as Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509
U.S. 764 (1993)).
126. See supra Part I.A.1.
127. Indeed, the Court dispensed with those arguments in a quite cursory way. See Buxbaum,
National Courts, Global Cartels, supra note 87, at 1106.
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case, it left no room for consideration of the substantive regulatory goals
that a broader role for domestic actions might further.
In the securities context too, the jurisdictional analysis based on
territorial links respects the sovereignty of other countries, but fails to
account fairly for the global arguments made in favor of U.S.
jurisdiction. Given that publicly available information does, in an
efficient market, affect trading prices, and given that such information is
disseminated efficiently on a worldwide basis through the
interconnected financial markets, it makes little sense to suggest that the
effects of fraud can be territorially segregated.128 Such an approach bars
courts from even considering arguments that a patchwork of local
remedies might insufficiently deter issuers from taking advantage of
linked markets to manipulate the prices at which their securities trade.'29
The traditional rules encourage courts to consider markets separately,
and view their role as protecting conditions only within U.S. markets, 3 '
whereas the cases brought by foreign purchasers might be seen
differently-as indicating that global market conditions permit
fraudulent behavior to affect global markets with immediacy, and
therefore require additional resources, perhaps in the form of domestic
actions, to counter that behavior.
128. The complaint filed in the China Life Insurance case makes this argument: "Indeed, it
would be impossible for the fraud-on-the-market theory to apply within the U.S. but not outside
of it, because if securities reacted to information only within the U.S., global traders would take
advantage of the price differential and buy on one exchange to sell on another." Amended
Complaint, In Re China Life Ins. Co. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-02112 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2005); see also Brian P. Murray and Maurice Pesso, The Accident of Efficiency: Foreign
Exchanges, American Depository Receipts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 383 (2003)
(arguing that the linkage between U.S. and foreign markets creates efficient trading with respect
at least to dual-listed securities, therefore supporting broader application of U.S. law in cross-
border securities cases).
129. See Michaels, supra note 85, at 123 (arguing that judicial focus on territorial concepts
prevents courts from dealing properly with global market cases). For a more globally oriented
argument, see Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 372 (3d. Cir. 2002) (holding that
sponsoring an ADR program in the United States constituted purposeful availment of U.S.
markets, and noting the consequence of linked trading: "Although [plaintiff] does not allege that
the fraudulent media releases and annual reports were specifically directed to American investors,
a foreign corporation that has created an American market for its securities can fairly expect that
that market will rely on reports and media releases issued by the corporation.").
130. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 295 (1982) (criticizing
the territory-based jurisdictional provisions of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1965) for their inability to guide courts in considering systemic values
of the international community).
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Where consensus exists on certain regulatory standards,' 3' an
expanded role for domestic courts in litigating global harm flowing
from violation of those standards might bring important regulatory
benefits. The rigid application of territory-based rules forecloses
consideration of those benefits. 1
3 2
2. Critique of the Revenue Rule
The application of the revenue rule in the tobacco cases further
illustrates the danger that overly rigid jurisdictional rules may preclude
valid arguments for transnational judicial cooperation. The courts in
these cases acknowledged the substantial uncertainty surrounding the
origins of the rule as well as abundant and long-standing criticism of the
rule from both courts and commentators;'33 some expressed clear doubts
about its continued vitality.'34 They nevertheless went on to apply the
rule in a rather formulaic fashion, thereby failing to address adequately
the dilemma posed by the civil RICO claims: the foreign nations that
lodge them seek to transcend traditional jurisdictional rules-rules
intended to safeguard order within the international community-in
order to achieve, in the name of that international community,
substantive regulatory goals. In considering this failure, it is important
to analyze the revenue cases in light of two major justifications for the
revenue rule. The first is avoiding the embarrassment of foreign nations;
the second, alleviating separation of powers concerns relevant to U.S.
foreign policy in the tax area.
13 1. See Introduction, supra (defining transnational regulatory litigation to encompass cases
in which the applicable domestic law embodies a substantive norm that is shared in the
international community, and not the more common cases in which substantive regulatory
provisions conflict).
132. Discretionary doctrines such as forum non conveniens would remain available to confine
the exercise of jurisdiction when necessary. See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and
Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (2004) (analyzing various substantive and
procedural mechanisms "that act as structural and political checks on universal jurisdiction in
[U.S.] civil litigation").
133. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
124-25 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing criticism of the rule reaching back to the 19th century); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483
Reporters' Note 2 (1987), (suggesting that the rule is obsolete).
134. See particularly Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 n.3
(ND.N.Y. 2000), aff'd 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), in which the district court noted that "[w]ere
[it] writing on a clean slate... it would be inclined to find the Revenue Rule to be outdated.. .and
the rationale for the rule to be largely unpersuasive."
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a. Concerns Related to the Embarrassment of Foreign Nations
The courts in revenue rule cases have characterized as the most
cogent rationale for the rule the principle that enforcing the tax laws of a
foreign sovereign would require inquiries into the purposes behind those
laws, and would therefore involve policy decisions that might embarrass
foreign governments."' This argument makes sense particularly when
courts apply the revenue rule in the traditional context: a suit brought in
the United States to enforce a foreign judgment for unpaid taxes.
Whenever a U.S. court is asked to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment, it inspects the judgment to ensure that its enforcement will
not contravene U.S. public policy-a task that involves some
investigation of the substantive law underlying the judgment.'36 In the
tax context, such an investigation might embarrass the foreign
sovereign, or lead to uncomfortable distinctions among the tax policies
of different countries. However, in the tobacco revenue cases, as the
foreign governments pointed out, the question was whether the
defendants had violated U.S. law. Determining liability under civil
RICO required merely the recognition of the tax laws in question.'37
135. The Supreme Court recently characterized this as the "principal evil" addressed by the
revenue rule. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 368 (2005). This rationale is drawn
from Learned Hand's concurring opinion in a domestic tax recognition case. Moore v. Mitchell,
30 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
136. See Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (Hand, J., concurring) ("Even in the case of ordinary
municipal liabilities, a court will not recognize those arising in a foreign state, if they run counter
to the 'settled public policy' of its own."). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(d) (1987) (addressing the public policy
exception in enforcement of foreign judgments).
137. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant the Attorney General of Canada at 3, Attorney Gen. of
Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Incs., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-7972)
("[A]ll parties agree that when a U.S. court enforces U.S. law, it may recognize the existence and
applicability of foreign law, including revenue law, factually relevant to the U.S. claim.") In
discussing a welfare fraud case, F.A. Mann provides an interesting illustration of this distinction:
A person had fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits from the Dutch State and
subsequently emigrated to Germany. The Dutch State sued in Germany for their return
on the ground of unjustified enrichment and tortious liability. The court expressly
"classified" or "characterized" the claim according to German public law, which allows
the recovery of unjustifiably obtained unemployment benefits. Consequently, the Dutch
State's claim was found to arise from public law, and, therefore, to be inadmissible. The
true question should have been whether the Dutch claim involved the assertion of Dutch
sovereign power within Germany as a matter of international law. It is submitted that it
did not. In substance, the plaintiff asserted a right in unjustified enrichment and tort
even if the claim had been founded on a provision in a Dutch social security statute. In
an international sense, the right existed independently of the special provision relating to
social security in either the Dutch or the German legislation.
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While the courts might need to examine the tax laws to determine
damages, the tobacco cases did not turn on whether the foreign tax laws
themselves were valid; therefore, no substantive examination was
necessary. '38
As the courts hearing the tobacco revenue cases recognized,'39 there
is substantial overlap between this argument and arguments made with
respect to the act of state doctrine. 4 ° That doctrine, which maintains that
U.S. courts will not sit in judgment of the acts of a foreign sovereign
taken within its own borders,'4 ' is intended to preserve harmonious
foreign relations by avoiding sensitive inquiries into a sovereign's
domestic conduct.'42 In the act of state context, however, a less rigid and
more functional analysis has emerged, as courts have been more willing
to distinguish between claims that only tangentially raise foreign acts
and claims that turn on an assessment of their validity. In an oft-cited
passage of its decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., International,'43 the Supreme Court stated:
The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases
and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but
merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be
F.A. Mann, The International Enforcement of Public Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603,
613-14 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
138. The court would not "risk having to declare [the foreign tax law] contrary to public
policy," to cite the primary concern underlying the revenue rule. Dodge, supra note 114, at 173;
see also R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 137-39 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (noting that U.S. criminal
proceedings involving evasion of foreign taxes similarly call upon U.S. courts to accept and
interpret foreign revenue law for sentencing purposes).
139. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 125-26.
140. The single U.S. case involving the application of the revenue rule in the traditional
context (a claim seeking direct enforcement of a Canadian tax judgment) relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's act of state jurisprudence and the possibility of embarrassing the foreign
sovereign by inspecting its taxation regime. Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597
F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
141. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987).
142. Canada in fact turned this argument the other way in its complaint, stating that the U.S.
courts, if they rejected jurisdiction in these cases, would in effect be violating the act of state
doctrine by refusing to recognize the validity of Canadian tax law. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant
the Attorney General of Canada, R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-7972), 2000
WL 33988832, at *30-31.
143. 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (determining whether a corporation's acts in procuring a foreign
government contract violated U.S. anti-bribery law).
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deemed valid. That doctrine has no application [in cases in
which] the validity of no foreign sovereign act is at issue.144
A similarly flexible analysis was applied in one act of state case that
bears striking similarities to the tobacco revenue cases. In the late
1980s, the Republic of the Philippines brought civil RICO claims
against Ferdinand Marcos, seeking damages flowing from his theft of
money from the national fiSC. 145 As the Ninth Circuit recognized, "the
gravamen of the Republic's entire case is the allegation that the
Marcoses stole public money.' 1 46 In an opinion addressing the foreign
relations implications of the case, the court held that the exercise of
jurisdiction was appropriate. It acknowledged that it might need to
investigate Philippine law to answer whether various substantive
criminal violations had in fact been established, but held that doing so
would not create the sort of foreign relations problems the act of state
doctrine guarded against. 14 As the concurring opinion noted most
directly, act of state was acknowledged as a "prudential decision to
refrain from adjudicating the legality of a foreign sovereign's public
acts that were committed within its own territory,"'148 but not as a
doctrine that would bar every adjudication affecting a foreign sovereign.
The case invoked certain specific limitations of the act of state
doctrine: for instance, it was relevant to the outcome that the act of state
doctrine was not designed to protect a deposed leader from adjudication
of earlier acts, but to protect a sitting government.'49 Additionally, the
court concluded that an act of theft could not be considered a public,
sovereign act and therefore was entitled to no presumption of validity.
Nevertheless, viewed more broadly, this case resembles the tobacco
revenue cases in that it involves a foreign nation seeking access to U.S.
court, and application of U.S. law, to assist it in dealing with cross-
border conduct. (In an interesting bit of dictum, a recent Supreme Court
144. Id. at409-10.
145. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. Id. at 1359. Harold Koh briefly notes this case, suggesting that it can be read to fall
within his definition of transnational public-law litigation. See Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, supra note 4, at 2371 n.128 (noting that "though the current Philippine government
undeniably seeks retrospective redress, its actions appear strongly motivated by the prospective
political aim of solidifying its own standing").
147. Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1361 (considering these also under the heading of political
questions).
148. Id. at 1369 (Schroder, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
149. See id. at 1360-61 (majority opinion).
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decision, discussed in more detail below, lends weight to this
comparison. 5 Addressing the effects of cross-border smuggling, in the
context of a criminal prosecution, 5' it notes that "tax evasion deprived
Canada of that money, inflicting an economic injury no less than had
[defendants] embezzled funds from the Canadian treasury."'52 This
statement indicates that the type of conduct complained of by the
Philippine government in the Marcos case is analogous to that
complained of by the Canadian and other governments in the tobacco
revenue cases.)
When another government itself weighs potential foreign relations
issues and decides actively to seek the intercession of a U.S. court, there
is little possibility of embarrassment.'53 A more flexible analysis, such
as that developed in the act of state context, would be more appropriate
in revenue claims cases than the outright bar established by the revenue
rule.
b. Separation of Powers Concerns
Some of the smuggling operations that gave rise to the civil tobacco
revenue cases also led to criminal prosecutions. In these cases, the
United States initiated proceedings, under federal wire fraud and money
laundering statutes, against individuals involved in the smuggling.'54 It
was clear in each of the cases that the underlying goal of the activity
was to defraud the Canadian government by depriving it of tax revenue;
thus, as in the civil cases, the defendants invoked the revenue rule. They
argued that the U.S. courts would be called upon to review the foreign
tax legislation in question, and that the rule therefore barred their
150. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
151. The opinion expressly reserved the question whether the same result would obtain in
civil RICO actions brought by foreign governments, but is nevertheless instructive. Id. at 355 n. 1.
152. Id. at 356.
153. Cf Dodge, supra note 114, at 212-15 (characterizing concerns about the embarrassment
of foreign nations in this context as overstated).
154. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing defendants'
participation in financial transactions, intended to defraud the Canadian government of tax
revenue, in violation of wire fraud and money laundering statutes); United States v. Miller, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 415 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2004)
(discussing a conspiracy to launder the proceeds of a wire fraud scheme, intended to defraud both
the United States and Canada); United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing
conspiracy to launder money); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing
wire fraud counts, but affirming conviction for violation of anti-bribery statute).
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prosecution. The courts disagreed.155 While they recognized that the
substance of the allegations included depriving a foreign sovereign of
tax revenue, they characterized the cases as ordinary domestic criminal
proceedings. One court stated that "[a]t the heart of this indictment is
the misuse of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the
Canadian government of tax revenue, not the validity of a foreign
sovereign's revenue laws," '15 6 further noting that "whether our decision
today indirectly assists our Canadian neighbors... in the collection of
taxes, is not our Court's concern." '157 In its recent decision in
Pasquantino v. United States, another case involving a domestic
criminal prosecution related to foreign tax evasion, the Supreme Court
affirmed this reasoning.'58 It stressed that the object of the action was
the enforcement of domestic criminal law, under a wire fraud statute
"advanc[ing] the Federal Government's independent interest in
punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct."' 59 It held that the
revenue rule did not bar such criminal prosecutions, siding with the
majority of the appellate courts that had considered the question. 160
The argument that the heart of the relevant claims was a violation of
domestic law was precisely the argument made by the foreign
sovereigns in the tobacco revenue cases. As Canada's brief stated,
"[The] claim is that defendants violated U.S. laws RICO and predicate
crimes thereunder. No legal principle bars the District Court from
recognizing, as a factual element of a RICO claim, that Canada imposes
taxes on cigarettes."' 61 In a dissenting opinion in the Canadian case,
Judge Calabresi put it this way: "we are bound to entertain suits brought
under federal statutes, and to award the damages that such statutes
establish.... [B]y enacting RICO, our government has determined that
this suit advances our own interests, and any collateral effect furthering
the governmental interests of a foreign sovereign is, therefore,
necessarily incidental." '162
155. The decision in United States v. Boots was the exception, but its holding has essentially
been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Pasquantino.
156. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 553.
158. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359-69 (2005).
159. Id. at 365.
160. The decision thus implicitly overruled Boots, the outlier in this group of criminal cases.
161. Brief for the Attorney General of Canada at 20, Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-7972).
162. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (rejecting the civil-criminal
distinction made by the majority).
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In considering the role of private actions under U.S. law as part of the
larger set of mechanisms used to combat global harm, it is noteworthy
that both the civil and the criminal cases, with differing emphasis,
involve the same goals: restitution of unpaid tax revenue to the
defrauded sovereign, and deterrence of criminal misconduct. This fact
was recognized, although not fully analyzed, by the Supreme Court in
Pasquantino. The Court noted that the criminal proceeding would likely
involve direct restitution to Canada of the tax revenue lost to
smuggling.'63 In other words, a successful prosecution by the United
States in that case would achieve essentially what Canada sought
directly in its civil claim against R.J. Reynolds-financial compensation
for foregone tax revenue.'64 In its conclusion, however, the Court notes
that "it may seem an odd use of the Federal Government's resources to
prosecute a U.S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada.' 165
This comment implies the Court's awareness that the U.S. government
may indeed have initiated the action in order to assist Canada in coping
with the consequences of cross-border smuggling. Justice Ginsburg
states this more straightforwardly in her dissenting opinion, noting that
the prosecution "'is primarily about enforcing Canadian law."
66
The only viable explanation for the differentiated application of the
revenue rule seems to be that the criminal prosecutions were initiated by
the U.S. government, whereas the civil claims were not. This distinction
is based on the separation of powers justification for the rule: these
cases might implicate foreign policy goals of the United States, and the
163. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 365 (citing the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). The Court nevertheless attempted to distinguish
the criminal case at issue from the civil cases: "The main object of [civil cases in which the
revenue rule had been applied] was the collection of money that would pay foreign tax claims....
The absence of such an object in this action means that the link between this prosecution and
foreign tax collection is incidental and attenuated at best." Id.
164. RICO claims of course seek multiple damages, not merely simple compensation. The
plaintiff governments in the civil cases argued further that civil and criminal proceedings would
have an identical deterrent effect. The Supreme Court, in contrast, maintained that criminal
proceedings would advance the independent interest of the U.S. federal government in punishing
domestic fraud, an interest that would not be served in the civil RICO cases. Id. at 365.
165. Id. at 372.
166. Id. at 377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321,
342-43 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Gregory, J., dissenting). While Justice Ginsburg correctly
observed this connection between the outcomes of the civil and criminal cases, she then used it as
the basis of her conclusion that the revenue rule should apply to the criminal cases as well. Id. at
375-83.
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judiciary should avoid entanglement in that policy. 167 This argument
was indeed critical to the revenue rule analysis in the criminal cases.
The courts, noting that the rule is discretionary, opined that by initiating
prosecution the executive branch had indicated that the need for
litigation outweighed any potential foreign relations problems, thus
avoiding the harm the revenue rule was designed to prevent. 168
Similarly, the courts in the civil cases drew on this analysis in
distinguishing the precedent set by the criminal cases. 169 On this view,
because the executive branch has signaled its conclusion that
prosecution of the claims will not lead to foreign affairs problems, the
criminal cases do not implicate the concerns addressed by the revenue
rule.
Separation of powers concerns are relevant in the taxation context
because the United States has entered into a variety of cooperative tax
treaties with other countries, which together reflect a foreign policy on
cross-border tax matters. Some of the courts in the civil cases stressed
the existence of treaties for cooperative assistance in tax matters, and
the associated implication that such assistance would be rendered only
within the framework of those instruments. 70 As commentators have
suggested, applying the revenue rule to bar enforcement efforts by
sovereigns outside the treaty framework may encourage other nations to
enter into more comprehensive mutual assistance instruments with the
United States."' Yet the criminal proceedings indicate that the
167. See Dodge, supra note 114, at 226-31 (describing the rationale behind the distinction
between private and governmental plaintiffs).
168. See, e.g., Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369 ("[B]y electing to bring this prosecution, the
Executive has assessed this prosecution's impact on this Nation's relationship with Canada, and
concluded that it poses little danger of causing international friction.").
169. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d at 123:
When the United States prosecutes a criminal action, the United States Attorney acts
in the interest of the United States, and his or her conduct is subject to the oversight of
the executive branch. Thus, the foreign relations interests of the United States may be
accommodated throughout the litigation. In contrast, a civil RICO case brought to
recover tax revenues by a foreign sovereign to further its own interest, may be, but is not
necessarily, consistent with the policies and interests of the United States.
170. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d at 119 ("It seems to us that the
usual absence in our negotiated tax conventions of any provision for the extraterritorial
enforcement of a sovereign's tax judgments or claims cannot be accidental, but instead must
reflect the considered policy of the political branches of our government."). Justice Ginsburg
echoed this finding in her dissent in Pasquantino. 544 U.S. at 381 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 114, at 234-35; see also Dodge, supra note 73, at 121-22
(making a similar argument that the strong extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws
prompts other nations to negotiate cooperation instruments).
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government is indeed willing, at least in individual cases, to use its
resources to prosecute conduct for the benefit of a foreign
government.12 If that is true, then our courts are simply giving with one
hand what they withhold in the other, namely assistance outside the
treaty framework. In an era during which we seek more, rather than less,
coordination and cooperation among sovereigns in battling economic
misconduct, it is difficult to see how such an ad hoc approach, coupled
with refusals to assist other states in civil cases like the tax revenue
litigation, will facilitate further negotiation.'73 The rejection of a claim
initiated directly by a foreign government might appear an even more
pointed insult than an assertion of jurisdiction in claims against a
foreign private company over the objections of that government.'74 A
better approach would be to abandon the revenue rule, while
recognizing that when a particular complaint presents a concrete
conflict with foreign policy, the executive branch can so indicate and
therefore seek judicial deference in light of that policy.'75
In sum, the analysis applied in the civil revenue cases discounts the
extent to which different strategies may be pursued to reach the same
substantive result. In effectuating the revenue rule, the courts missed an
172. Even if foreign governments enjoyed no direct financial gain from such prosecutions
(see Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 365, suggesting that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act should
perhaps be construed to prohibit compensatory awards to foreign governments in such cases),
they would benefit from the additional deterrence value those prosecutions provide.
173. See Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, supra note 4, at 2395 ("Although judges
seek to avoid playing roles in international politics, they inevitably do so both by deciding cases
and by not deciding them."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked
World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 321-23 (2004) (warning that while some conflict might
be "positive" conflict, promoting additional cooperation, other conflict is quite plainly negative
conflict that "can destroy social and political relationships").
174. The Supreme Court addressed this point in a slightly different context in the Pfizer case,
in which it held that foreign sovereigns were entitled to initiate private actions under the Clayton
Act. 434 U.S. at 318-19.
This Court has long recognized the rule that a foreign nation is generally entitled to
prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States upon the same basis as a
domestic corporation or individual might do. "To deny him this privilege would
manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling."
Id. (citations omitted).
From a U.S. perspective, it may seem hypocritical that countries long opposed to private
actions for multiple damages under U.S. law will initiate such lawsuits themselves when doing so
serves their purposes. From the perspective of these countries, however, it may seem equally
hypocritical that our courts appear ready to adjudicate such claims except when those countries
stand to benefit.
175. This approach would reserve judicial abstention for the circumstances in which it was
required, rather than bar legitimate claims in a manner undermining international cooperation.
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opportunity to enhance the international cooperation necessary to
combat cross-border misconduct. (While two of the tobacco revenue
decisions were vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Pasquantino,17 6 the Second Circuit, in that reconsideration, has invoked
again the distinction between civil and criminal enforcement.)' 77 It
would be more satisfactory to view these cases as variations on the same
theme: the need to develop cooperative mechanisms by which states can
address global misconduct.178 The revenue rule as currently applied
often leads to decisions that, in the name of foreign relations, run
counter to the wishes of our allies regarding cross-border issues. One
might instead see litigation like the tobacco revenue cases as an
opportunity for additional cooperation-a form of cooperation to be
layered upon, and not viewed as inconsistent with, cooperation
involving nonjudicial actors. On that view, courts could begin to play a
more integral role in the process of transgovernmental regulation.
III. MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: BEHIND THE
JURISDICTIONAL RULES
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that the application of
territory-based jurisdictional rules prevents U.S. courts from fully
considering arguments made for the use of transnational regulatory
actions as a mechanism of global regulation. This Part turns to a
different question: identifying the concerns that underlie traditional
jurisdictional law, and that motivate criticism of transnational litigation.
Richard Falk's cogent warning of over forty years ago serves as a
starting point for this discussion:
No service is rendered to international law when officials act
upon the pretense that a shared community of policy, interest,
and value underlies the contemporary network of global relations
and is hence available for implementation by each national actor.
176. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005) (vacating and remanding the
cases brought by the European Commission against RJR Nabisco and Japan Tobacco).
177. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d. 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2005) (reinstating its
earlier holding and noting that in a suit not brought or otherwise endorsed by the U.S.
government, "the factors that led the Pasquantino Court to hold the revenue rule inapplicable to §
1343 smuggling prosecutions are missing..."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1045 (2006).
178. For a similar argument in the human rights context, see Stephens, supra note 11, at 37-
39 (discussing the broad range of civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings that together
constitute a network of enforcement mechanisms).
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This pretension supports the treatment of national policy,
interest, and value as if they were universal. Such behavior
invites retaliation, engenders distrust, and undermines those
actual and potential claims of international law to make stable the
relations among the entire community of states.'79
This Part inspects the claims made for transnational regulatory
litigation with this warning in mind. It notes that foreign countries,
through the invocation of traditional jurisdictional rules, sometimes
resist regulatory litigation in U.S. courts in order to preserve specific
local practices or policies that the case at hand implicates. Sometimes,
though, their resistance makes a more general statement-not
necessarily related to the particular substantive rule at issue-about
power and order within the international community. An assessment of
the role of domestic courts in transnational litigation must address both
categories of concerns.
A. Specific Functional Concerns
1. Interference with Other Solutions to Cross-border Misconduct
One basis for resisting litigation in U.S. courts is that it might
interfere with other measures developed to address the specific harm in
question. This point has been made often in the context of public law
litigation. Germany objected to lawsuits in U.S. courts based on
Holocaust-era claims because they were inconsistent with its objectives
in negotiating an international settlement regarding those claims; Japan
objected to claims brought by former "comfort women" because they
were inconsistent with understandings reached in the post-war peace
negotiations; South Africa objected to cases arising out of apartheid-era
policies because they were inconsistent with domestic reparations
programs, including the work of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. 80 While the validity of these objections in each particular
179. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 6 (1964).
180. See infra Part IV.B for additional discussion of these cases. In his concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren, Judge Bork noted generally that "the prospect of innumerable private suits at the end of
a war might be an obstacle to the negotiation of peace and the resumption of normal relations
between nations." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring); see also Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights
Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2305, 2343-44 (2004) (noting that
litigation before U.S. courts potentially interferes with other strategies for social change).
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case is the subject of debate, they raise the legitimate question whether
transnational litigation is appropriate when it conflicts with other, local,
mechanisms to address various harms.18' Such conflicts between
competing solutions to global problems arise in the economic cases as
well. In the vitamin cartel litigation, for instance, several governments
argued that the availability of private actions in U.S. courts would
undermine the effectiveness of local amnesty programs used to enhance
domestic regulatory efforts.'82
As some commentators have argued in the public law context, the
substantive benefit to be gained through domestic transnational
litigation (there, for instance, increased security of fundamental human
rights) is important enough to require a careful approach to concerns
regarding conflict with other mechanisms. In the economic context too,
where transnational cases promise the possibility of increased economic
welfare, a differentiated analysis of the particular objections raised is
necessary. While conflict with amnesty programs might arise in some
countries, for instance, other countries might not have such programs
and therefore might not share the same objection.'83 Thus, it is important
not to extrapolate global statements about the inappropriateness of
transnational litigation from specific conflicts experienced in particular
jurisdictions. There is a danger that using the rhetoric of territorial
sovereignty in articulating these concerns invests them with the false
appearance of universality, and suggests general limits to transnational
litigation. While specific instances of interference must be taken
seriously, that rhetoric should be resisted, with the focus remaining
181. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles, 92 GEo. L.J. 1057, 1119 ("The deliberations surrounding a society's
program of transitional justice are not the sort that should be displaced by the paternalistic
judgment of international law."); cf Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 200-202
(2004) (advocating a more critical stance toward claims that domestic litigation would interfere
with local programs).
182. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004) (noting the
argument that prospective liability in U.S. courts would reduce the incentive for corporations to
take advantage of amnesty programs).
183. It is noteworthy that in F Hoffmann-La Roche, the governments on whose markets the
purchase transactions in question had taken place-Ecuador, the Ukraine, Panama and
Australia-did not themselves file amicus briefs. The countries that did file such briefs may
therefore have been generalizing from their own programs.
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instead on defining the functional role of transnational litigation in
particular settings.184
2. Discomfort with the Use of Private Litigation as a Regulatory
Mechanism
A second concern reflected in the insistence on traditional
jurisdictional principles is that private lawsuits may be inappropriate
means to pursue public regulatory goals. The foreign government briefs
filed in the vitamins cartel litigation focused on this point, stating the
preference of certain national systems for administrative and criminal
regulation.'85 In this light, the traditional territorial allocation of
jurisdictional power preserves disparate local regulatory cultures."6
Like the concerns regarding conflict with specific regulatory
mechanisms, however, these should be seen as limited to particular
countries and issues rather than as a global objection to transnational
litigation. Furthermore, the weight of this concern is diminishing as
other systems move toward adoption of private attorney general-type
mechanisms. Developments in the European Union, many of whose
member states have historically opposed private actions in regulatory
matters, provide one illustration of a shift in favor of civil regulatory
enforcement.'87 While private rights of action under EU competition
law, for instance, have been used only infrequently to date,"' it is
currently a priority of the Commission to enhance those rights.'89 More
184. Thus, the possibility of a specific conflict with some legal systems should not bar the
availability of transnational litigation to plaintiffs from other systems. Part IV discusses a means
of achieving this differentiation.
185. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No.
03-724) (noting that "Germany's focus in obtaining the desired deterrent effect of illegal
restraints of trade is on prosecution through its competition authorities").
186. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of Competition
Law: A Historical Perspective on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 23 BERK. J.
INT'L L. 474 (2005).
187. See Andre Fiebig, Modernization of European Competition Law as a Form of
Convergence, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 63, 64 (2005) (describing the Commission's plans in
this regard and noting that "[a]lthough the European Commission has not formally recognized
convergence with U.S. antitrust law as one of the objectives of the modernization process, it will
be one of the unintended results").
188. See, e.g., Case 127/73 (No. 1), Belgische Radio en Televise v. SV Sabam, 1974 E.C.R.
51.
189. See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
COM (2005) 672 [hereinafter Commission Green Paper] (presenting various policy options
intended to strengthen private enforcement of competition law); see also Donncadh Woods, The
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generally, partly in connection with the adoption of a group claim
mechanism in the consumer protection area, Europeans have begun to
consider whether various forms of group actions might be useful in
other fields. 90 It is also worth noting that Canada and the European
states, in initiating private actions under the civil provisions of RICO,
showed some willingness to use private actions when they would create
local regulatory benefit.
3. Concern with Using the Vehicle of Domestic Law to Serve
Global Goals
Finally, the application of traditional jurisdictional rules responds to a
"delivery system" problem: even if a transnational case involves a
shared substantive norm, using domestic law as the vehicle for its
application carries with it associated norms that are not shared. Some of
these are procedural. For instance, litigation before a U.S. court will
involve processes for the discovery of evidence, or the examination of
witnesses, that might differ substantially from such processes in other
countries.' 9 ' This problem surfaces in all U.S. civil litigation involving
international elements, including public law cases brought under the
ATCA. In the economic context, this problem is magnified due to the
availability under U.S. law of supercompensatory relief. The treble
damages available in civil actions under both antitrust law and RICO
are unavailable in many other jurisdictions, and in some are viewed as
incompatible with public policy.'92 Their availability was one of the
major objections of the defendants and their home governments in the
global cartel cases.'93
Growth of Private Rights of Action Outside the United States: Private Enforcement of Antitrust
Rules-Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431
(2004) (discussing reasons for the low rate of private enforcements to date, and describing the
effect of the recent modernization program).
190. See generally DIE BUJNDELUNG GLEICHGERICHTETER INTERESSEN IM PROZEB:
VERBANDSKLAGE UND GRUPPENKLAGE (J. Basedow et al. eds., 1999).
191. See Waller, supra note 99, at 532 (noting that private antitrust claims in U.S. courts
involve not only substantive law but "all the other things that make U.S. litigation so
controversial around the world").
192. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 251-52 (2001)
(discussing this problem in the antitrust context).
193. See, e.g., Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
8, F. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
[Vol. 46:2
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY LITIGATION
Elsewhere in this article I have referred to this problem as an issue of
secondary importance next to differences in substantive standards.
194
This characterization is not meant to diminish the magnitude of the
concern, which today remains a significant and valid objection to the
use of U.S. courts in transnational economic cases.' 95 As standards here
converge, however, the force of this objection will diminish. With
respect to procedural rules, ongoing efforts to adopt rules of civil
procedure for use in transnational cases create some hope of future
agreement.'96 With respect to the substantive issue of remedies, there are
already signs of convergence at least with European Union member
states. As part of its push to strengthen private rights of action in
antitrust, the European Commission is advocating the award of double
damages in certain categories of private antitrust claims, which would
be a step toward eliminating one of the major current points of
contention.' 97 These are long-term projects, however, and in the
meantime transnational regulatory law must account for objections
based on the differences between civil litigation systems.
B. General Concerns About Community
While traditional jurisdictional principles serve as the framework for
resolving specific conflicts of the sort described above, they also shape,
and reflect, the views of states about the organization of the
international community.'9 8 Grappling with the challenges of regulating
global activity therefore requires more than simply finding a way to
expand, alter or abandon particular jurisdictional rules. It requires an
inquiry into the worldview that those rules represent, and into shared
194. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
195. See Peter Schlosser, Jurisdiction and International Judicial and Administrative
Cooperation, 284 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (2000), for an overview of some of these issues.
196. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE/UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004).
197. See Commission Green Paper, supra note 189, at 7; Woods, supra note 189; JUrgen
Basedow, Private Enforcement of Article 81 EC: A German View, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 143 (2003)
("If the [European] Commission wants to use private initiative for the purposes of enforcing
competition laws in the public interest, it should consider the US model of a private attorney
general who is spurred to enforce the law by the expectation of treble damages.").
198. See Rudolf Dolzer, Extraterritoriale Anwendung von nationalem Recht aus der Sicht des
V6lkerrechts, BITBURGER GESPRACHE 2003 71, 71 (referring to the link between national
jurisdictional rules and the "international balance of sovereignty, state, law and power"; see also
F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Law Revisited, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1984).
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understandings about the role that particular nations or national actors
play in institutionalizing substantive norms. In this sense, the concerns
behind the invocation of jurisdictional law are more general: that is,
unlike the functional concerns, they transcend particular country-
specific conflicts. Whichever foreign government might raise them, they
aim to articulate a shared vision of international community.
Such concerns prompt much of the criticism of expansive use of the
ATCA as well as expansive jurisdiction in economic litigation. In its
brief in the Sosa case, for instance, the European Commission stated
that:
[I]n order to respect the authority of States and organizations,
like the European Community, exercising their authority to
regulate activities occurring on their own territory, and hence to
preserve harmonious international relations, States must respect
the limits imposed by international law on the authority of any
individual State to apply its laws beyond its own territory.199
Here, then, other countries contest not so much the overriding of
specific local policies, but rather the manner in which expansive
jurisdiction in U.S. courts seemingly breaks the international compact.
For a number of reasons, concerns regarding this consequence of
domestic actions have even greater salience in transnational economic
litigation than in public law litigation. They must be addressed in order
to establish whether such litigation can be reconciled with the concerns
regarding international community.
1. Concern That a Norm Applied in Domestic Litigation Is Not a
Shared Norm
The first concern regarding domestic litigation in transnational cases
stems from the most significant difference between public law litigation
and economic litigation: the latter seeks to apply not international law
but domestic regulatory law. This raises the possibility that the forum's
regulatory law does not in fact reflect a shared norm, but merely the
forum state's unique regulatory policies. If that is the case, then a civil
action applying that law is not an instance of transnational litigation, but
rather a typical extraterritoriality case-an attempt to apply to foreign-
linked transactions a rule of law that differs from the rule in other
199. Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party, at 2,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036.
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jurisdictions affected. 0 It is therefore critical in these cases, particularly
because regulatory norms lack the claim to universality that can be
made for fundamental human rights in the transnational public law
context,20' to establish that the regulatory norm in question is indeed
shared.
I do not mean to suggest that there is a large group of shared
regulatory norms today, or that assessing the functional equivalence of
disparate standards in order to identify those that are shared is a simple
task. There is wide divergence in regulatory law and policy
internationally, and even countries that agree on basic regulatory
principles adopt laws of substantial variety in their detail. 22
Nevertheless, one can identify some starting points. In the area of
securities regulation, for instance, there is substantial diversity across
jurisdictions. Different systems have different approaches to basic
issues such as the appropriate level of disclosure, let alone more specific
questions such as the definition of market manipulation or the
establishment of appropriate sanctions for misconduct. Yet in the past
decade much progress has been made toward the adoption of
International Disclosure Standards 23 and International Accounting
Standards.20 4 As countries integrate these standards into their domestic
regulatory regimes, such common principles will form a set of shared
norms. Though not as clearly defined, consensus also seems to be
200. See supra Part I.B.2, discussing the categorical distinction between classic
extraterritorial jurisdiction cases and transnational regulatory litigation.
201. Public law litigation recognizes this problem of shared norms as well. See, e.g., Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the requirement of general assent is
critical; otherwise "the courts of one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules
upon others, in the name of applying international law"). Nevertheless, the quality of international
consensus is different in the public law context. While it is true that even the universality of
human rights norms is contested in some quarters, agreement on the basics is largely assumed.
See HIGGINS, supra note 80, at 96-97 (recognizing the suggestion "that there can be no fully
universal concept of human rights, for it is necessary to take into account the diverse cultures and
political systems of the world," but defending the universality of essential human rights).
202. See Gerber, supra note 74, at 302 n.19 (noting that "even where there has been
convergence in substantive principles, differences in the actual operation and application of
norms often remain").
203. See International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International
Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers (Sept.
1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81 .pdf.
204. See Technical Committee of IOSCO, Statement on the Development and Use of
International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005 (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD182.pdf (applauding the progress made
toward convergence on accounting standards).
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emerging on certain categories of egregious misconduct, including some
forms of insider trading.2 °5 Again, while there is distance to travel
between general agreement and specific rules, the trend is toward
consensus. Regional developments also may contribute to the ultimate
development of shared norms: the EU Prospectus, Transparency, and
Market Abuse Directives, for instance, establish uniform standards on
various issues for all member states and, in their similarity to U.S.
standards, take a step toward further consensus.20 6
In the antitrust context too, national laws reflect a wide variety of
regulatory approaches and there are many issues on which there is no
discernible consensus. However, a shared view emerges on the question
of hard-core price-fixing. It is reflected in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's platform against hard-core
cartels,0 7 for instance, and in the nearly universal prohibition against
205. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the
International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (1992) (discussing
the increased adoption of insider trading statutes in various jurisdictions); see also IOSCO,
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, International Organisation of Securities
Commissioners (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD82.pdf (identifying the prohibition of insider trading as one goal of harmonized
securities laws).
206. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus
to be Published When Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending
Directive 2001/34 (Prospectus Directive) (implemented by Commission Regulation 809/2004,
2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC)); Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers
Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) (Transparency Directive); Directive 2004/72/EC of 29
April 2004 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as
Regards Accepted Market Practices, the Definition of Inside Information in relation to derivatives
on Commodities, the Drawing Up of Lists of Insiders, the Notification of Managers' Transactions
and the Notification of Suspicious Transactions (Market Abuse Directive); see also Roberta S.
Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 379
(2005) (describing these instruments and assessing both progress toward eventual convergence
and various obstacles that remain); Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of
International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 91-92 (1999) (discussing steps taken
within the European Union toward a "quasi-uniform" disclosure system).
207. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), C(98)35/F1NAL,
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels (Mar.
25, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf (recommending
convergence of legal standards to halt and deter hard-core cartels); see also OECD, Hard Core
Cartels 5 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/24/2367816.pdf (recognizing the
"multi-billion dollar drain on the global economy" caused by hard-core cartels and encouraging
implementation of legal standards by non-member states as well).
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such conduct across national systems. 2°s Thus, while it is unlikely that
every jurisdiction will share a regulatory approach to the letter, it is fair
to conclude that some basics have the agreement of all regulating
jurisdictions.2 9 It is worth noting that some courts have already
addressed arguments that antitrust rules rise to the level of customary
international law, in the form of attempts to bring competition law-
based tort claims under the ATCA.21 ° In relatively cursory statements,
these courts have rejected such claims, concluding that customary
international law requires a level of consistent state practice that does
not exist in the antitrust field today.21 I However, the courts approached
the question not with respect to individual norms but with respect to
antitrust systems more broadly, where, as noted above, there is no
general consensus.212 Their conclusions therefore do not undermine the
possibility that national systems share particular individual norms,
including a prohibition of hard-core price-fixing.
In the area of criminal behavior that gives rise to RICO claims, broad
consensus on some issues can be identified. Every state collects taxes
and prohibits nonpayment, 23 and there are shared policies on the
208. See International Competition Network, Cartel Working Group Mandate, available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/cartelworkplan2004.pdf; see also First, supra
note 14, at 727 (noting that "we have already achieved a de facto international competition law in
the area of cartel behavior"). It was on this basis that the plaintiffs in the Empagran case
emphasized the fact that hard-core price-fixing is "universally condemned." See supra note 17
and accompanying text.
209. It does not necessarily follow that consensus will spread to other issues. See Edward T.
Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 640 n.37 (2001)
(referring to agreement on price fixing as "low-hanging fruit").
210. See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In
re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 717 (D. Md. 2001). Such arguments
have now been precluded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004), which narrowed the category of claims that could be brought under ATCA.
211. But see Waller, supra note 99, at 535 (suggesting that such claims are nevertheless not
frivolous, noting the development of antitrust regimes worldwide and the growing network of
private rights of action used by plaintiffs); see also Spencer Weber Waller, An International
Common Law of Antitrust, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 163 (1999) (investigating whether any current
principles meet the standard for custom, using a general nondiscrimination principle as an
example); Swaine, supra note 209 (discussing the possibility of more localized custom).
212. See, e.g., Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (referring in its citations to divergence in
antitrust law generally and not specifically to hard-core price-fixing). In addition, the court in the
Microsoft case seemed to seek evidence not of customary international law but of treaties or other
formal international agreements, or "enforceable international antitrust law." In re Microsoft, 127
F. Supp. 2d at 717.
213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 483 Reporters' Note 2 (1987) (noting that "virtually all states impose and collect taxes").
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deterrence of particular crimes, including money laundering,' 4
bribery,215 and smuggling, that constitute predicate violations under
RICO.216 There is therefore enough evidence of consensus on particular
rules to indicate some shared regulatory norms in this area.
Furthermore, as in other areas of cross-border regulation, that category
is likely to expand, not contract, as the process of regulatory
harmonization continues.2t 7
2. Concern That a Norm Applied in Domestic Litigation Lacks
International Legitimacy
Even when a shared norm is applied, the processes by which the
norm was developed may engender challenges to its legitimacy. This
concern arises even with respect to the international human rights norms
applied in ATCA cases, as critics have questioned both the source and
the universality of those norms. Some commentators have argued
simply for a more careful consideration of the rules applied, in light of
the unique problems raised by their application in national courts. 18
Others have more broadly challenged substantive human rights law as
an imposition of Western values on other cultures.219 Such challenges
reflect uneasiness with the use of domestic tribunals to promote the
214. See Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations (2003), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,2340,en_32250379_32236930_33658140 1 1 1 l.html
(the FATF was established in 1989 by the G-7 heads of state); see also W. Clifton Holmes,
Comment: Strengthening Available Evidence-Gathering Tools in the Fight Against Transnational
Money Laundering, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 199, 217-18 (2003) (cataloging the tools currently
used to combat money laundering and suggesting that a customary international norm exists on
that issue); Financial Action Task Force, 55 Jurisdictions Agree to Fight Money Laundering (June
2005), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/27/34988026.pdf.
215. See Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral Cooperation to Combat
Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 731, 763 (2000) (describing the evolution of a "multilateral normative regime" against
bribery).
216. See Dodge, supra note 114, at 214 (noting convergence in the content of such laws).
217. In the competition arena, for instance, the Doha round called for increasing
harmonization across national systems. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(0l)/DEC/l (Nov. 20, 2001), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 746 (2001).
218. See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 501, 505 (2000) (calling for closer analysis of "the engagement of domestic law
with international law in [each] particular setting," and therefore resisting the proposition that
"[i]f the domestic application of international law is equated with the recognition of a global
standard of good, then any and every domestic application is desirable").
219. See, e.g., M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal
Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1137-40 (1998).
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norms in question worldwide, even where one could fairly assume
consensus.
These legitimacy concerns are even more substantial in the case of
economic laws, as the development of international consensus on
regulatory policy plays out against the backdrop of disparate economic
power. Many of the accounts describing the process of regulatory
harmonization reflect skepticism as to the true nature of that
consensus."' The political realities of the negotiating process lead to
convergence around the policies of the more powerful states,221 with the
result that one may question the international legitimacy of the norms
adopted.222 The soft-law aspects of harmonization, including the use of
bilateral regulatory agreements and the technical assistance that
regulators in developed countries offer to those in emerging systems,
raise similar concerns.223 These objections are necessarily limited in that
the consent by a sovereign state to accept a particular norm must have
consequences-that is, once states subscribe to a particular norm
through the political process, they should not themselves protest the
subsequent application of those norms. But the concerns of observers on
this point do speak to continued reservations regarding the
appropriateness of applying international regulatory norms in domestic
220. See generally JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW
134-59 (1999) (discussing the mechanisms that "pressure other states to conform to the standards
emerging" in the United States); Part VII (Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, Democracy, and
Accountability), TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND
POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
221. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for
Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 149, 150 (1993) (stating that in the context of securities regulation, the goal of U.S.
policymakers is to have other countries adopt U.S. disclosure standards); David J. Gerber, The
US.-European Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience
Perspective, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 123, 133 (1999) (making a similar observation in the antitrust
context).
222. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
18 (1996) ("The new transnational regimes.. .are assuming a specific form, one wherein the states
of the highly developed countries play a strategic geopolitical role. The hegemony of neoliberal
concepts of economic relations.. has contributed to the formation of transnational legal regimes
that are centered in Western economic concepts.").
223. The cause of these concerns is apparent on the surface of many accounts of transnational
networks, which generally focus on the spread outward of liberal/capitalist systems. See, e.g.,
Slaughter, supra note 6, at 193 (noting that transgovernmental networks are concentrated among
liberal democracies, and can help "build democratic institutions" in other states).
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courts-particularly, as discussed in the next Section, if both the source
of the norms and their enforcement are centralized in one country.
224
3. Concern That Transnational Litigation Is an Instrument of U.S.
Hegemony
Although set into motion by individuals, it is nevertheless the
machinery of a state that transnational litigation uses to achieve a
regulatory end. Because to date it is the American state, in particular,
whose courts conduct such litigation,225 this raises concerns about the
role of the United States in the global arena.2 6 The expansion of
jurisdictional rules that necessarily accompanies the use of national
courts in the way above described disturbs the order that jurisdictional
law brings to the international community-in ways that, to foreign
states and many observers, appear as violations of the international law
whose very purpose is to safeguard the international community against
overreaching by individual nations. Thus, as one commentator has
noted, this kind of litigation says something "about the social
distribution of power within the international community., 227 The most
pointed criticism of this type casts transnational litigation as the product
of intentional hegemonic behavior of the United States. 228  More
moderate criticism suggests a degree of judicial imperialism at work in
224. See Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for
International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109, 116 (2000) (noting that "some states are more
sovereign than others" in designing the global system); Serge Sur, The State Between
Fragmentation and Globalization, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 421 (1997) (arguing that "the new rules of
the game, or simply the erasing of the old rules, flow from the will of a state, that of the United
States").
225. There are some exceptions: in the public-law context, see supra note 11; in the private-
law context, see the Provimi cartel litigation, supra note 83, and the decision of a French court,
the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, in cross-border litigation against Yahoo! (discussed in
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1183-85
(9th Cir. 2004) (subsequent proceedings in U.S. court related to the French order enjoining
Yahoo! from permitting web access in France to certain Nazi-related materials)).
226. See Gerber, supra note 74, at 298 (referring to the "geo-political context" of cross-border
regulation by the United States); see also Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony:
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369 (2005)
(examining the relationship between dominant states and international law); id. at 403-04
(discussing the role of U.S. extraterritoriality in this context).
227. Chibundu, supra note 219, at 1147.
228. See, e.g., id. at 1100 (describing "the interests of the various outsiders upon whom
United States judicial power is hegemonically enforced"); Sur, supra note 224, at 428-29; Ugo
Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003).
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these cases. 229 Some U.S. judges worry about overreaching, 23 ° and some
foreign governments seek to confine the power of the United States.23" '
Against this backdrop, expanding the use of civil litigation in U.S.
courts to serve global regulatory goals is highly problematic from an
international relations point of view.
Even if the functional concerns outlined in Part III.A can be
adequately addressed, the concerns about the international community
are too much to override. Ultimately, the question is whether the case
for enhanced substantive regulation is strong enough to convince other
states that the jurisdictional framework should make room for
transnational regulatory litigation.232
IV. THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY LITIGATION:
INTEGRATION INTO THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, transnational litigation creates a
tension between two goals: increased effectiveness in regulating
economic misconduct and maintenance of order within the international
community. The question, then, is whether there is a way to reconcile
the substantive regulatory benefits of such cases with concerns
regarding their foreign policy implications. The answer to that question
will depend on whether transnational litigation can be successfully
integrated into the broader spectrum of global regulatory mechanisms
that states have already developed. These solutions reflect a shift in the
conceptualization of sovereign regulatory power-a shift that, in
departing from a territory-driven view of regulatory authority,
229. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of
the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 381
(2001) (in the context of Holocaust-era claims brought in U.S. courts); Van Schaack, supra note
180, at 2347 (recognizing arguments addressing the possible hegemonic implications of these
claims).
230. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (Trott, J.,
dissenting in part) ("What the majority has unintentionally accomplished in embracing this case is
nothing less than the wholesale creation of a World Court, an international tribunal with
breathtaking and limitless jurisdiction to entertain the World's failures, no matter where they
happen, when they happen, to whom they happen, the identity of the wrongdoer, and the
sovereignty of one of the parties.").
23 1. See Buxbaum, supra note 186 (discussing the resistance of the German government to
such litigation).
232. See FALK, supra note 179, at 32 ("[The] horizontal order, with its emphasis upon
reciprocity, depends heavily upon states' convincing one another that they are acting reasonably
in regard to the delimitation of legal competence.")
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accommodates the more flexible application of jurisdictional rules that
transnational litigation requires. However, an examination of regulatory
developments in this broader context also reveals the continued
importance of statehood and particularly of state consent. This Part
addresses first the international regulatory context within which
transnational cases must be situated, and then turns to the question of
consent.
A. The De-territorialization of Sovereign Authority
Developments in economic regulation over the past few decades have
changed our perception of what sovereign authority means. They
include the widespread utilization of sub-state level agreements (for
example, bilateral memoranda of understanding executed between
regulatory agencies) that ensure mutual assistance in pursuing cross-
border violations. They also include, in some geographic areas, the re-
allocation of regulatory authority to the regional level. These
developments have reconfigured regulatory authority to address the
globalized economy, retreating from a model in which sovereign power
is power over discrete territory. It does not follow, however, that they
have eliminated statehood from the equation. Some accounts of these
changes do incorporate them into larger arguments about the
development of a non-state based global order. 33 But other accounts,
which seem more accurately to capture developments at least in the
regulatory arena, point not to the disappearance of the state but to the
disaggregation of its elements into transgovernmental networks.234 As
constituted in this way, sovereignty is about participation in an
institutional framework that maximizes the achievement of strategic
policy goals. Drawing on the work of Chayes and Chayes, Anne-Marie
Slaughter defines the "new sovereignty" as "the capacity to participate
in the international and transgovernmental regimes, networks, and
institutions that are now necessary to allow governments to accomplish
through cooperation with one another what they could once only hope
233. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD (1991) (discussing the shift away
from a system in which nation-states guard purely national interests); SUSAN STRANGE, THE
RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996)
(discussing the "hollowing out" of the state).
234. See Slaughter, supra note 6.
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to accomplish acting alone within a defined territory., 235 What is taking
place, then, is a reconceptualization of sovereignty that deemphasizes
the notion of absolute control over particular territory, but nevertheless
maintains the importance of statehood and of an international
community of states.236
In emphasizing the notion of participation in the evolving
transnational regime, this account preserves a role for state consent.
When states develop the various regulatory mechanisms used to address
the global economy, they choose to accept a diminishment of their
territorial authority in exchange for a perceived gain in regulatory
power. The transition from a state-based system of competition
regulation to the current regional architecture, for instance, certainly
cost European states some of the incidents of classical sovereignty-
exclusive control over competitive conditions within their respective
territories, and the right to act autonomously in external relations. But
this was arguably no diminishment of regulatory power or authority.
The rationalization of economic policy within the EU was necessary to
free trade, and the regionalization of economic regulatory power gave
the EU leverage in external relations that the individual states would
235. Slaughter, supra note 173, at 285; see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995).
236. See STEVEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 13-14 (1999)
(noting the relationship between "interdependence sovereignty" and sovereignty conceived as
internal domestic control); WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? 54-58 (1998) (discussing the impact of economic interdependence on
external and internal sovereignty); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the
Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 425 (1999). The continued importance of state mechanisms is evident in the
regulatory arena. National regulatory agencies continue to review mergers, national courts
continue to adjudicate commercial claims, and countries continue to negotiate cooperation
treaties. The fluidity with which regulatory competence is allocated also belies the notion of the
disappearing state. In 2003, for instance, a significant revision of European competition law
reallocated power over some forms of conduct. It moved authority back to the member states to
deal with exemptions for certain types of agreements, thereby reversing the long-standing
position of the Commission that it had a monopoly on such decisions. See Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution, 37
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 537 (2000). This illustrates the continued importance of the state as a site
of regulatory authority even within the regional framework. See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the
Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 841, 846-47 (discussing
the contingency of revocable delegations of sovereignty).
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separately not have enjoyed. 237 Thus, if one theorizes sovereignty as
status within the international community,238 then it was a sovereignty-
enhancing move by individual European states to collectivize their
territorial authority.239 Similar observations can be made about the layer
of bilateral cooperation instruments that promote shared regulation in
cross-border cases.24° These too involve a choice by state agencies to
cede exclusive power over territory in order to gain instrumental power
over the forms of conduct subject to regulation. Thus, the tools of the
"new sovereignty" are deployed within the international community
with the consent of the relevant states to the new mechanisms.24' In that
sense, while these mechanisms cannot ensure a true balance of power
among all nations, they can at least retain the formal equality that
sovereignty promises.242
In de-emphasizing territory and encouraging participation in global
processes at all levels of the state architecture, the transgovernmental
framework suggests a role for national courts in the regulatory process.
The development of that role, however, must address the question of
state consent. For transnational litigation to become an effective element
in global economic regulation, the consent of the other countries
involved-some level of agreement that they also favor the leveraging
237. See generally Fiebig, supra note 187, at 79 (discussing the initial communitarization of
European competition law and the regulatory objectives it served). In the area of merger control,
for instance, the European Union now engages with U.S. regulators very much as an equal.
238. See Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
195, 198 (2004) ("Territorial sovereignty was the source of empowerment and authority for rulers
of competing states to negotiate with one another and to agree upon a course of conduct between
and among the states they controlled and ruled.").
239. See Raustiala, supra note 234, at 843 (sketching the "sovereignty-strengthening"
dimensions of the new global system).
240. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002);
Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the
Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1035-45 (1997); David Zaring,
International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory
Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281 (1998) (all examining the development and operation of
sub-state-level networks in areas including securities, antitrust, banking, and environmental law).
241. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the US. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1989, 1994 (2004) (noting that such tools reflect the
choice of states to limit their own freedom of action).
242. See Nico Krisch, More Equal Than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance
in International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2004).
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of additional regulatory resources through U.S. courts-is necessary.243
In private actions initiated by foreign states themselves, consent is not
an issue. There, as suggested above, what is required is a broader view
of the U.S. jurisdictional principles applied in such cases. Transnational
litigation initiated by private claimants, however, requires a procedural
mechanism to obtain the consent of foreign states.
B. State Consent to Participation in Global Class Actions
1. Foreign Government Intercession in U.S. Litigation
Intercession by foreign governments, in various forms, is a common
feature in cross-border litigation. Sometimes it is formalized through
agreements negotiated by the executive branches of governments and
then referred to in individual cases. For instance, the settlement reached
in 2000 between Germany and the United States affected slave labor
cases brought in U.S. courts arising out of Holocaust-era activity in
Germany. 44 In that agreement, the United States agreed to file a
statement of interest in any further private litigation, indicating that it
frowned on such cases as inconsistent with its foreign policy aims.
245
Germany filed similar statements in some of the cases, stating its own
understanding that U.S. courts would not hear private claims. 246 The
litigation involving Japanese "comfort women" used a similar
technique. 47 In these cases, the statements of foreign governments have
particular force because they relate to matters that were negotiated with
the U.S. government, raising the question of judicial deference in
matters of foreign affairs.248
243. Otherwise, as Paul Stephan has pointed out, noncooperation and retaliation may well
result. See Stephan, supra note 7, at 655-58.
244. Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,"
U.S.-F.G.R., July 17, 2000,39 I.L.M. 1298, 1300.
245. See discussion in Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The
Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (2002). This procedure has been observed, resulting in
the dismissal of subsequent claims in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank
AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
246. See Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1232 n.6.
247. Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (addressing sovereign immunity and a
similar political question objection raised by the U.S. government as well as the Japanese).
248. See generally Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004) (discussing
the tradition of executive branch intervention in sovereign immunity cases). Such intervention is
generally intended to protect the United States' own foreign policies, however, and not to voice
specific objections on behalf of foreign nations. See Ingrid Brunk Wurth, The Dangers of
Deference: International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 50-51 (2003)
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In other cases, foreign governments have simply described their
interest in the form of a statement to the court or an amicus brief. This
has been the case in some ATCA litigation. In one claim based on
environmental harm, for instance, the Republic of Ecuador filed a
motion to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs, its citizens, supporting
their claim in U.S. court as a means of protecting Ecuadorians from
environmental contamination and noting specifically that litigation in
the United States "does not under any concept damage the sovereignty
of the Republic of Ecuador." '249 To the opposite effect, in cases
involving reparations for the policies of apartheid, the Republic of
South Africa stated that litigation before U.S. courts would be
antithetical to its own internal political and economic policies.25 In
some economic litigation too, foreign governments have submitted
amicus briefs stating their objections to U.S. jurisdiction.25
In these cases, where the statements do not reflect an official policy
position of the United States, the appropriate level of deference is
debatable.252 Some such expressions, while they do not point to specific
actions by or policy of the U.S. executive branch, receive a certain
degree of support in amicus briefs filed by the U.S. government.253
Others receive no such support, direct or indirect. In either case,
statements of this kind do not present the same level of foreign affairs
concerns as statements that relate to specific, negotiated policy of the
(criticizing the reliance of U.S. courts on statements by the German government as a basis for
dismissing otherwise cognizable claims).
249. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting an affidavit submitted by
Ecuador's Attorney General in support of a motion to intervene which was ultimately rejected as
insufficient to waive sovereign immunity). But see id. at 157 (discussing a competing filing
contesting jurisdiction). See also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 11, 1994) (discussing a subsequent brief in which Ecuador stated an expectation that
"disputes relating to the development of Ecuador's natural resources are to be adjudicated by the
courts of Ecuador").
250. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). South
Africa's position is also discussed in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 754 n.21 (2004).
251. See the Empagran briefs, discussed supra Part H.A.l. See also the briefs filed, for
example, in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No. 91-1111), the last
case prior to Empagran to reach the Supreme Court on the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
252. See Wurth, supra note 248, at 50-51 (arguing the need for further distinctions based on
"constitutional text and historical practice" to prevent over-deference by the judicial branch).
253. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, F.
Hoffmann La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 234125
(acknowledging the view of other countries that assertion of jurisdiction over the claims of
foreign purchasers would infringe their sovereignty, and recognizing the potential strain on
international cooperation that would follow).
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United States. Nevertheless, they do serve to signal potential foreign
relations problems that would attend an assertion of jurisdiction. In the
economic regulatory arena, where the use of U.S. courts and the
concomitant application of U.S. law raise special concerns, they must
therefore be taken seriously. Because reading them as blanket objections
to all transnational regulatory litigation in U.S. courts would entirely
foreclose the advantages of such litigation, however, a more
differentiated mechanism is required.
2. Class Actions and Government Consent
The potential of class actions in transnational litigation is evident
outside the regulatory arena. Although most ATCA claims are brought
on behalf of named individuals, for instance, many have been initiated
as class actions;254 in addition, some commentators have proposed
expanding this device in addressing human rights violations.255 There
are substantial limitations on the development of the global class action
in public law litigation, however. First, there are high procedural
barriers to class certification.256 Second, the ATCA, which has been the
most important vehicle for public law litigation to date, underwrites the
claims only of foreign plaintiffs;257 thus, class actions under the ATCA
do not involve parallel groups of foreign and U.S. claimants. As a
consequence, absent the involvement of U.S. plaintiffs, the courts will
254. Successful class actions include In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F.
Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995) (group claim seeking damages for human rights violations of the
Marcos regime), and In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (group claim brought against Swiss banks for Holocaust-era taking of assets). See Van
Schaack, supra note 180, at 2314-15 (describing how the ATCA "was 'discovered' by plaintiff-
side lawyers more accustomed to bringing shareholder derivative actions and mass tort litigation
through the class action mechanism," leading to an increase in group claims under the statute).
255. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353 (2003) (discussing the possibility of human-rights class actions
before international, not domestic, tribunals); Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights
Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643 (2004).
256. Assembling class actions that meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 is no easy matter, as there is often insufficient typicality and/or commonality of claims. See
discussion in Vagts & Murray, supra note 245, at 518-26. For a more optimistic account of class
actions in this context, see Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2005).
257. While the Torture Victims Protection Act contemplates claims by U.S. as well as foreign
plaintiffs, the claims must be against individuals who act under the authority of, or under color of
law of, a foreign nation. This renders claims by U.S. plaintiffs unlikely. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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more willingly dismiss claims on a discretionary basis pursuant to the
doctrine offorum non conveniens.255
Virtually all transnational antitrust and securities cases, by contrast,
are class actions.259 Because in these cases the claim to U.S. legislative
jurisdiction rests on effects within the United States, the typical case
involves a mixed group of plaintiffs-purchasers who suffered harm in
U.S.-market and in foreign-market transactions, respectively. These
plaintiffs use the class-action procedures whose application is
commonplace in economic regulatory cases, and some of which
explicitly contemplate the inclusion of foreign plaintiffs.26 ° In the typical
transnational regulatory case, then, courts have considered whether
jurisdictional principles require them to split the proposed class into two
groups, dismissing the claims brought by foreign purchasers on
jurisdictional grounds, while permitting the litigation involving U.S.
plaintiffs to proceed. 261' These characteristics of regulatory class actions
258. See Boyd, supra note 132, at 16-17.
259. There are exceptions, including Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac V.O.F.,
241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). See Salil K. Mehra, Foreign-Injured Antitrust Plaintiffs in U.S.
Courts: Ends and Means, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 347, 358 (2004).
260. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), for example, which enacted certain
procedures to be used in securities class actions, there are no restrictions on foreign plaintiffs
serving as lead plaintiffs or as class representatives. See Takeda v. Turbodyne Technologies, Inc.,
67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("It is evident there is no per se rule against the
certification of a class whose members are both foreign and American investors. Nor is there a
prohibition against having a mix of foreign and American investors serve as class
representatives."). See generally Stuart M. Grant and Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Investors
in Federal Securities Class Actions, 1442 PLI/Corp. 91 (2004) for a description of the mechanics
involved in such claims.
261. See, e.g., Tri Star Farms v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567 (W.D. Pa. 2002); In re
Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000) (both allowing securities litigation to go
forward in the United States only with respect to the purchasers of securities on U.S. markets);
Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (antitrust
case splitting the plaintiff group based on where the transactions in question had been invoiced).
Sometimes the issue of prescriptive jurisdiction arises directly, in the context of motions to
dismiss the foreign claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Bayer AG Sec.
Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd after repleading, 2005
WL 2222273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss the foreign claims
included in the proposed class). It can also arise indirectly, in the context of procedural motions
relating to the certification of a class or the selection of a lead plaintiff. Some courts, for instance,
have rejected the motion of a foreign purchaser to be named lead plaintiff on the ground that its
claims were subject to unique jurisdictional defenses not shared by U.S. claimants. See, e.g., In re
Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. and ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 348 (D. Md. 2003); cf In re Cable &
Wireless, PLC Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 377 (E.D. Va. 2003) (exercising its discretion in
similar circumstances to appoint one U.S. and one foreign claimant as co-lead plaintiffs). Other
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have two consequences. First, unlike in the human rights context, where
there is no U.S. action independent of the action brought by foreign
plaintiffs, here judicial efficiencies may be realized through the
coordinated adjudication of transnational cases in a single forum.262
Second, the class action procedure creates an opportunity for foreign
governments to signal their consent, or lack thereof, to transnational
regulatory litigation that involves their nationals as plaintiffs.
In transnational securities and antitrust cases of the kind here
described,263 U.S. courts should not automatically dismiss the claims of
foreign purchasers on the basis of traditional territory-based
jurisdictional rules. Nor, however, as I argued in Part III, can they
legitimately override the objections of other nations involved in
asserting prescriptive jurisdiction over all such claims. Instead, the
courts should require as part of the class certification process that such
claims be supported by a statement of the government in whose markets
the relevant transactions occurred, to the effect that it would not object
to the litigation of those claims in U.S. court.264 The submission of such
a statement would not alone guarantee the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction
over such claims-for instance, a court might determine that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish other factors necessary for the
certification of a global class, 65 or that the misconduct in question had
courts have refused to certify classes including foreign plaintiffs on the ground that jurisdictional
difficulties fiustrate the typicality requirement, or defeat the superiority of class litigation to other
forms of litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (typicality requirement for class actions); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (providing that the "class action [must be] superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
262. This conclusion assumes-as appears increasingly likely-that the foreign claims would
proceed in a foreign court if dismissed in U.S. litigation. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the
spread of private enforcement mechanisms in other countries). At the least, the assertion of
jurisdiction over the foreign claims would create substantially less marginal cost for U.S. courts
than the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign public law claims, which would not otherwise be
litigated in the United States at all.
263. That is, cases involving intertwined cross-border harm and effect and also the
application of a shared regulatory norm.
264. Counsel for the lead plaintiffs could obtain such statements following initial certification
of a class otherwise meeting procedural requirements.
265. See Ilona T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized
Economy-Permitting Foreign Plaintiffs to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S.
Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1563, 1582-84 (2005) (discussing whether the notification
requirements would cause due process concerns with regard to foreign claimants); cf In re
Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262, 1998 WL 50211, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
1998) (concluding that "given the capabilities of modem international law firms and the
comparative complexities of class action notice procedures, the issue of foreign notice is not
sufficiently grave to defeat class certification").
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caused effects within the United States insufficient to trigger
applicability of U.S. regulatory law even to U.S.-based claims. But it
would permit courts to consider in a more balanced way the arguments
presented for and against U.S. jurisdiction in transnational regulatory
cases. This device would have several important benefits.
a. The Preclusive Effect of Settlement or Judgment in Class
Actions
As a threshold matter, such an approval would address one of the
procedural concerns that often arises in class actions involving foreign
claimants: that any settlement or judgment would lack preclusive effect
in foreign jurisdictions.266 Courts in other nations might decline to
recognize the outcome of a U.S. class action, and might permit class
members to relitigate their claims locally, depriving the class action
mechanism of its primary benefit.267 Some courts have refused to certify
classes including foreign plaintiffs for this reason.26 Advance approval
by the relevant foreign government, however, would signal the absence
of any disagreement with U.S. procedural rules on which basis its courts
might refuse to recognize the resulting settlement or judgment.269
266. See Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and
Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41 (2003); Janet Walker, Crossborder Class
Actions: A View From Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755 (2004).
267. Cf Gordon A. Christensen, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 405, 514 (1997) (discussing this risk in connection with human rights litigation:
"Even if American due process were satisfied in constituting the class, might another government
interested in protecting its own citizens claim that the federal court did not proceed fairly under
international standards? Members of the class... might mount a collateral attack though their own
government."); Walker, supra note 266, at 764 ("[In cases involving multinational plaintiff
classes it is arguable that fairness, and possibly due process, require jurisdictional standards to be
informed by the likelihood that the certification order will be recognized by the courts in other
potential fora as binding on class members who might choose to sue there. The question that
arises from this is how courts in the United States might be able to anticipate whether a
certification order will be recognized by a foreign court.").
268. See, e.g., In re Daimler-Chrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003)
(upon motion to certify a mixed class, excluding foreign claimants partly due to "the likelihood
that foreign courts will not recognize and enforce a U.S. judgment, and therefore, defendants may
be subject to multiple and potentially inconsistent adjudications in foreign countries"); cf In re
Lloyd's Am., 1998 WL 50211 (recognizing the objection but concluding that certification was
nevertheless appropriate).
269. A foreign government could also signal its assent to the litigation while noting that,
should a resulting judgment be brought before its courts, enforcement would be limited to
compensatory damages according to local public policy. The right to deny preclusive effect to a
settlement or judgment that violated U.S. standards of due process would in any event remain.
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b. Case-Specific Consideration
Most importantly, requiring such a statement would permit a more
particularized approach to balancing the substantive benefits of
regulation through U.S. courts and the possible foreign objections in any
given case. U.S. courts would neither bar all claims of foreign
purchasers on the assumption that asserting jurisdiction over them
would pose foreign relations problems, nor permit claims where doing
so would raise legitimate objections of the sort outlined in Part III.
Nations amenable to the use of U.S. judicial resources in the regulatory
process could benefit from their exercise, while still preserving the right
of other nations to pursue preferred local remedies for cross-border
misconduct.27 ° No single state, then, would speak for another.
271
c. Reducing the Risks of Broad Deference by the Judicial Branch
Using foreign government approval as the basis for separating
permissible from nonpermissible claims would eliminate the need for
U.S. courts to scrutinize other countries' antitrust enforcement
mechanisms in order to determine whether litigation in the United States
would indeed conflict with local regulation, a case-by-case approach
that the Supreme Court and some commentators have characterized as
unworkable. 272 U.S. courts would no longer need to rely on tenuous
presumptions based on action or inaction by foreign governments, 273 or
270. Such an approach might be criticized with respect to human rights cases, where one
might expect offending nations to resist actions that might bring them to account. It is better
suited to the economic context, where the potential application of U.S. domestic law, rather than
international law, gives additional force to foreign concerns about undue trespass on foreign
sovereignty.
271. This is one of the difficulties with foreign objections that condemn all transnational
litigation: they might prevent U.S. litigation in situations in which other nations, particularly
developing nations, might favor it. But see Mattei & Lena, supra note 229, at 396-98 (arguing
that the class action mechanism is inescapably a tool of American hegemony, as its use facilitates
the spread of U.S. legal culture and procedural standards).
272. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004); Wolfgang
Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application
of US. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 220-24 (2005).
273. For an illustration of this problem in the public law context, see Pacheco de Perez v.
AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 1998) (comparing one case in which the foreign
government in question had spoken to the pending litigation with another in which the
government had not, concluding that: "[W]e think it significant.. .that the Venezuelan government
has taken no position on whether this lawsuit proceeds in the United States or in Venezuela.
Without such an indication from the foreign nation, we are reluctant to find that the plaintiffs'
private cause of action sounding in Georgia tort law implicates important foreign policy on the
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on the assumption that only the U.S. executive branch could properly
consider the question of potential conflict with other countries.
However, the filing of such a statement would not foreclose the right of
the U.S. executive branch to submit its own statement of interest in a
particular case, signaling a stronger case for judicial deference in
litigation implicating specific and compelling foreign policy concerns.
d. Optimizing Local Regulation
Finally, if a state in whose markets purchasers suffered harm chose
not to submit such an authorization, it might then feel prompted to
regulate the conduct locally to the best of its ability.274 Having objected
to U.S. litigation on the basis of conflicts with its own regulatory
scheme, in other words, a foreign country might be less willing later to
leave the conduct unregulated. Thus, even if the claims of certain
foreign purchasers were not ultimately litigated in U.S. court, their
filing could potentially highlight the local enforcement of
internationally shared standards of conduct and thereby improve global
regulation overall.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that transnational regulatory litigation can,
under proper circumstances, enable national courts to participate in
implementing effective regulatory strategies for global markets.
Developing this role for the courts requires an approach that integrates
substantive regulatory values with community-shaping values, rather
than placing them at odds with each other. International jurisdictional
principles should not be seen as barriers that prevent the development of
necessary solutions to evolving forms of economic misconduct. Such an
approach not only sacrifices potentially valuable regulatory benefits, but
ignores the many changes that have already altered our understanding of
face of the plaintiffs' pleadings."). See also Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 804 (9th
Cir. 2001) (noting the risk of asking foreign governments to state their interests in amicus briefs
and then ignoring their objections).
274. A risk would remain that some governments would file an objection simply to protect
their own defendant corporations. See Clifford A. Jones, Foreign Plaintiffs, Vitamins, and the
Sherman Antitrust Act After Empagran, 7-8 EUR. L. REP. 270, 274 (2004) (speculating that
Germany's motivation in filing its brief in Empagran related to its defense of German corporation
BASF, one of the defendants). Given the shared nature of the regulatory norms in transnational
litigation, however, such an action might create ill will in the regulatory community.
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what sovereignty means in the global context. Nor, however, can
jurisdictional law devolve into yet another articulation of political and
economic power in the international community. A judicial role that is
accepted as legitimate only in the country whose courts adopt it does
little to advance the coordination and cooperation necessary for
effective global regulation. This Article has attempted to sketch the
conditions under which transnational regulatory litigation can fit into
the more expansive set of regulatory mechanisms accepted by the
international community. If that can be achieved, then, in the economic
arena as in other fields, national courts can realize their potential as
actors in the transgovernmental process.
* * *
